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Abstract
We consider zero-sum stochastic games with finite state and action spaces, perfect infor-
mation, mean payoff criteria, without any irreducibility assumption on the Markov chains
associated to strategies (multichain games). The value of such a game can be characterized
by a system of nonlinear equations, involving the mean payoff vector and an auxiliary vector
(relative value or bias). We develop here a policy iteration algorithm for zero-sum stochas-
tic games with mean payoff, following an idea of two of the authors (Cochet-Terrasson and
Gaubert, C. R. Math. Acad. Sci. Paris, 2006). The algorithm relies on a notion of nonlinear
spectral projection (Akian and Gaubert, Nonlinear Analysis TMA, 2003), which is analogous
to the notion of reduction of super-harmonic functions in linear potential theory. To avoid
cycling, at each degenerate iteration (in which the mean payoff vector is not improved), the
new relative value is obtained by reducing the earlier one. We show that the sequence of values
and relative values satisfies a lexicographical monotonicity property, which implies that the
algorithm does terminate. We illustrate the algorithm by a mean-payoff version of Richman
games (stochastic tug-of-war or discrete infinity Laplacian type equation), in which degenerate
iterations are frequent. We report numerical experiments on large scale instances, arising from
the latter games, as well as from monotone discretizations of a mean-payoff pursuit-evasion
deterministic differential game.
2010 Mathematics Subject Classification: 91A20; 31C45; 47H09; 91A15; 91A43; 90C40
1 Introduction
The mean-payoff problem for zero-sum two player multichain games We consider a
zero-sum stochastic game with finite state space [n] := {1, . . . , n}, finite action spaces A and B for
the first and second player respectively, and perfect information. In the case of the finite horizon
problem, in which the payoff of the game induced by a pair of strategies of the two players is
defined as the expectation of the sum in finite horizon of the successive rewards (the payments of
the first player to the second player), Shapley showed (see [Sha03]) that the value vτi of the game
with horizon T and initial state i ∈ [n] satisfies the dynamic programming equation vT+1 = f(vT ),
with a dynamic programming operator f : Rn → Rn defined as :
[f(v)]i = min
a∈A
max
b∈B
∑
j∈[n]
P abij vj + r
ab
i
 , ∀i ∈ [n], v ∈ Rn .
Here, rabi and P
ab
ij represent respectively the reward in state i ∈ [n] and the transition probability
from state i to state j ∈ [n], when the actions of the first and second players are respectively equal
to a ∈ A and b ∈ B.
The above dynamic programming operator f is order-preserving, meaning that v ≤ w =⇒
f(v) ≤ f(w) where ≤ denotes the partial ordering of Rn, and additively homogeneous, meaning
that it commutes with the addition of a constant vector. These two conditions imply that f
is nonexpansive in the sup-norm (see for instance [CT80], see also [GG04] for more background
on this class of nonlinear maps). Moreover, f is polyhedral, meaning that there is a covering of
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Rn by finitely many polyhedra such that the restriction of f to any of these polyhedra is affine.
Kohlberg [Koh80] showed that if f is a polyhedral self-map of Rn that is nonexpansive in some
norm, then, there exist two vectors η and v in Rn such that f(tη + v) = (t+ 1)η + v, for all t ∈ R
large enough. A map of the form t 7→ tη + v is called a half-line, and η is its slope. It is invariant
if it satisfies the latter property. Moreover this property is equivalent to the following system of
nonlinear equations for the couple (η, v) :{
η = fˆ(η) ,
η + v = f´η(v) ,
(1)
where the maps fˆ (the recession function) and f´η are constructed from f (see Section 2).
When f has an invariant half-line with slope η, the growth rate of its orbits (also called the
cycle time) χ(f) := limk→∞ fk(v)/k exists and is equal to η. Here, fk denotes the k-th iterate of
f , and v is an arbitrary vector of Rn. This shows in particular that the value of the finite horizon
game satisfies limT→∞ vTi /T = ηi for any final reward. Moreover, ηi gives the value of the game
with initial state i, and mean payoff, that is such that the payoff of the game induced by a pair of
strategies of the two players is the Cesaro limit of the expectation of the successive rewards. Then
a vector v such that t 7→ tη + v is an invariant half-line is called a relative value of the game, or
bias. It is not unique, even up to an additive constant.
In this paper, we give an algorithm to find an invariant half-line, or equivalently a solution
of (1), for general multichain games. This allows us in particular to determine the mean payoff, as
well as optimal strategies for both players. By multichain, we mean that there is no irreducibility
assumption on the Markov chains associated to the strategies of the two players, which may have
in particular several invariant measures.
Classes of games solvable by earlier policy iteration algorithms Policy iteration is a
general method initially introduced by Howard [How60] in the case of one player problems (Markov
decision processes). The idea is to compute a sequence of strategies as well as certain valuations,
which serve as optimality certificates, and to use the current valuation to improve the strategy. The
algorithm bears some resemblance with the Newton method, as the strategy determines a sub or
super-gradient of the dynamic programming operator. The key of the analysis of policy iteration
algorithms is generally to show that the sequence of valuations which are computed satisfies a
monotonicity property, from which it can be inferred that the same strategy is never selected
twice. In the discounted one player case, the valuation which is maintained by the algorithm is
nothing but the value vector of the current policy. For one-player games with mean-payoff, in the
unichain case (in which every stochastic matrix associated to a strategy has only one final class),
the valuation consists of the mean payoff of the current strategy, as well as of a relative value.
In both cases, the monotonicity property is natural (it relies on the discrete maximum principle,
or properties of monotonicity and contraction of the dynamic programming operator, or on the
uniqueness of the invariant measure associated to a strategy). However, even for one player games,
the extension to the multichain case is more difficult. It was initially proposed by Howard [How60].
The convergence of his method was established by Denardo and Fox [DF68].
The idea of extending Howard algorithm to the two player case appeared independently in the
work of Hoffman and Karp [HK66] for a subclass of mean-payoff games with imperfect informa-
tion, and in the work of Denardo [Den67] for discounted games. Both algorithms consist of nested
iterations; the internal iterations are a simplified version of the one player Howard algorithm. The
algorithm for discounted games appeared also, as an adaptation of the Hoffman-Karp algorithm,
in the work of Rao, Chandrasekaran, and Nair [RCN73, Algorithm 1] and of Puri [Pur95] (deter-
ministic games with perfect information). More recently, Raghavan and Syed [RS03] developed a
related algorithm in which strategy improvements involve only one state at each iteration.
The Hoffman-Karp algorithm requires the game to satisfy a strong irreducibility assumption
(each stochastic matrix arising from a choice of strategies of the two players must be irreducible).
Without an assumption of this kind, degenerate iterations, at which the mean payoff vector is not
improved, may occur, and so the algorithm may cycle (we shall indeed see such an example in
Section 6). This pathology appears in particular for the important subclass of deterministic mean
payoff games, for which the irreducibility assumption is essentially never satisfied.
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A natural idea to solve mean-payoff games, appearing for instance in the work of Puri [Pur95],
is to apply the policy iteration algorithm of Denardo [Den67] or Rao, Chandrasekaran, and
Nair [RCN73, Algorithm 1] for discounted games, choosing a given discount factor α sufficiently
close to one, which allows one to determine the so-called Blackwell optimal policies. For determin-
istic games, when the rewards are integers with modulus less or equal to W and the number of
states is equal to n, Zwick and Paterson [ZP96] showed that taking 1−α = 1/(4n3W ) is sufficient
to determine the mean payoff by a rounding argument. However this requires high precision arith-
metics. In the case of stochastic games, the situation is even worse, since examples are known in
which the value of 1 − α to be used for rounding has a denominator exponential in the number
of states. In particular, an approach of this kind is impracticable if one works in floating point
(bounded precision) arithmetics. Hence, it is desirable to have a policy iteration algorithm for
multichain stochastic games relying only on the computation of mean payoffs and relative values
as in the algorithm of Howard [How60] and Denardo and Fox [DF68].
The first policy iteration algorithm not relying on vanishing discount, for general (multichain)
deterministic mean payoff games, was apparently introduced by Cochet-Terrasson, Gaubert and
Gunawardena [CTGG99, GG98]. The former reference concerns the special case in which the mean
payoff is the same for all states at each iteration, whereas the second one covers the general case,
see also [CT01]. Details of implementation, as well as experimental results were given in [DG06].
The idea of the algorithm of [CTGG99] is to handle degenerate iterations by a tropical (max-plus)
spectral projector. The latter is a tropically linear retraction of the whole space onto the fixed
point set of the dynamic programming operator associated to a given strategy of the first player.
When the mean payoff or the current strategy is not improved, the new relative value is obtained
by applying a spectral projector to the earlier relative value. The proof of termination of the
algorithm [CTGG99] relies on a key ingredient from tropical spectral theory, that a fixed point
of a tropically linear map is uniquely defined by its restriction to the critical nodes (the nodes
appearing infinitely often in a strategy which gives the optimal mean payoff). Then, it was shown
in [CTGG99] that at each degenerate iteration, the relative value decreases, and that the set of
critical nodes also decreases, from which the termination of the algorithm can be deduced.
A related class of games consists of parity games, which can be encoded as special determinis-
tic games with mean payoff. A policy improvement algorithm for parity games was introduced
by Vo¨ge and Jurdzin´ski [VJ00]. This algorithm differs from the one of [CTGG99, GG98] in
that instead of the relative value, the algorithm maintains a set of relevant reachable vertices.
Other policy algorithm for parity games or deterministic mean payoff games were introduced
later on by Bjorklund, Sandberg and Vorobyov [BSV04, BV07], and by Jurdzin´ski, Paterson,
and Zwick [JPZ06]. An experimental comparison of algorithms for deterministic games was re-
cently made by Chaloupka [Cha11, Cha09], who also gave an optimized version of the algorithm
of [CTGG99, GG98, DG06].
In [BCPS04], Bielecki, Chancelier, Pliska, and Sulem used a policy iteration algorithm to solve a
semi-Markov mean-payoff game problem with infinite action spaces obtained from the discretization
of a quasi-variational inequality, based on the approach of [CTGG99, GG98]. Their algorithm
proceeds in a Hoffman and Karp fashion.
Policy iteration algorithm for stochastic multichain zero-sum games with mean payoff
Inspired by the policy iteration algorithm of [CTGG99, GG98] for deterministic games, Cochet-
Terrasson and Gaubert proposed in [CTG06] a policy iteration algorithm for general stochastic
games (see also [CT01] for a preliminary version). The relative values are now constructed using
the nonlinear analogues of tropical spectral projectors. These nonlinear projectors where introduced
by Akian and Gaubert in [AG03]. They can be thought of as a nonlinear analogues of the operation
of reduction of a super-harmonic function, arising in potential theory. However, no implementation
details were given in the short note [CTG06], in which the algorithm was stated abstractly, in terms
of invariant half-lines.
We develop here fully the idea of [CTG06], and describe a policy iteration algorithm for mul-
tichain stochastic games with mean-payoff (see Section 4.2). We explain how nonlinear systems of
the form (1) are solved at each iteration. We show in particular how non-linear spectral projections
can be computed, by solving an auxiliary (one player) optimal stopping problem. This relies on
the determination of the so called critical graph, the nodes of which (critical nodes) are visited
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infinitely often (almost surely) by an optimal strategy of a one player mean payoff stochastic game.
An algorithm to compute the critical graph, based on results on [AG03], is given in Section 5.3.
We give the proof of the convergence theorem (which was only stated in [CTG06]). In particular,
we show that the sequence (η(k), v(k), C(k)) consisting of the mean payoff vector, relative value
vector, and set of critical nodes, constructed by the algorithm satisfies a kind of lexicographical
monotonicity property so that it converges in finite time (see Section 4.3). The proof of convergence
exploits some results of spectral theory of convex order-preserving additively homogeneous maps,
by Akian and Gaubert [AG03]. Hence, the situation is somehow analogous to the deterministic
case [CTGG99], the technical results of tropical (linear) spectral theory used in [CTGG99] being
now replaced by their non-linear analogues [AG03]. Note also that the convergence proof of the
algorithm of [CTGG99, GG98] can be recovered as a special case of the present proof.
The convergence proof leads to a coarse exponential bound on the execution time of the algo-
rithm: the number of iterations of the first player is bounded by its number of strategies, and the
number of elementary iterations (resolutions of linear systems) is bounded by the product of the
number of strategies of both players.
We also show that the specialization of this algorithm to a one-player game gives an algorithm
which is similar to the multichain policy algorithm of Howard and Denardo and Fox, see Section 5.2.
Then, we discuss an example (see Section 6) involving a variant of Richman games [LLP+99]
(also called stochastic tug-of-war [PSSW09], related with discretizations of the infinity Lapla-
cian [Obe05]), showing that degenerate iterations do occur and that cyclic may occur with naive
policy iteration rules. Hence, the handling of degenerate iterations, that we do here by nonlinear
spectral projectors, cannot be dispensed with.
The present algorithm has been implemented in the C library PIGAMES by Detournay,
see [Det12] for more information. We finally report numerical experiments (see Section 7) car-
ried out using this library, both on random instances of Richman type games with various numbers
of states and on a class of discrete games arising from the monotone discretization of a pursuit-
evasion differential game. These examples indicate that degenerate iterations are frequent, so that
their treatment cannot be dispensed with. They also show that the algorithm scales well, allowing
one to solve structured instances with 106 nodes and 107 actions in a few hours of CPU time on a
single core processor (the bottleneck being the resolution of linear systems).
We note that our experimental are consistent with earlier experimental tests carried out for
simpler algorithms (dealing with one player or deterministic problems) of which the present one
is an extension. These tests indicate that policy iteration algorithms are fast on typical instances
(although instances with an exponential number of iterations have been recently constructed, as
discussed in the next subsection). Indeed, in the case of one-player deterministic games (max-
imal circuit mean problem), Dasdan, Irani and Guptka [DIG98] concluded that the instrumen-
tation of Howard’s policy iteration algorithm by Cochet-Terrasson et al. [CTCG+98], in which
each iteration is carried out in linear time, was the fastest algorithm on their test suite. Das-
dan latter on developed further optimizations of this method [Das04]. More recent experiments
by Georgiadis, Goldberg, Tarjan, and Werneck [GGTW09] have indicated that the class of cy-
cle based algorithms (to which [CTCG+98, Das04] belongs) is among the best performers, close
second to the tree based method of Young, Tarjan, and Orlin [YTO91]. In the determinis-
tic two player case, Chaloupka [Cha09] compared several algorithms and observed that the one
of [CTGG99, GG98, DG06], with the optimization that he introduced (see also [Cha11]), is exper-
imentally the best performer.
Alternative algorithms and complexity issues Gurvich, Karzanov and Khachiyan [GKK88]
were the first to develop a combinatorial algorithm (pumping algorithm) to solve zero-sum de-
terministic games with mean payoff. An alternative approach was developed by Zwick and Pa-
terson [ZP96], who showed that such a game can be solved by considering the finite horizon
game for a sufficiently large horizon, and applying a rounding argument. Both algorithms are
pseudo-polynomial. Other algorithms, also pseudo-polynomial, based on max-plus (tropical) cyclic
projections, with a value iteration flavor, have been developed by Butkovicˇ and Cuninghame-
Green [CGB03], Gaubert and Sergeev [GS07], and Akian, Gaubert, Nitic¸a and Singer [AGNS11].
Deterministic mean payoff games have been recently proved to be equivalent to decision problems
for tropical polyhedra (the tropical analogue of linear programming) [AGG12]. More generally, the
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results there show that stochastic games problems with mean payoff can be cast as tropical convex
(non-polyhedral) programming problems.
The pumping algorithm of [GKK88] was recently extended to the case of stochastic games
with perfect information by Boros, Elbassioni, Gurvich, and Makino [BEGM10]. They showed
that their algorithm is pseudo-polynomial when the number of states of the game at which a
random transition occurs remains fixed. No pseudo-polynomial seems currently known without
the latter restriction. Their algorithm applies to more general games than the ones covered by the
irreducibility assumption of Hoffman and Karp in [HK66], but it does not apply to all multichain
games.
The question of the complexity of deterministic mean payoff games was raised in [GKK88], and
it has remained open since that time. Note in this respect that such games are known to have
a good characterization in the sense of Edmonds, i.e., to be in NP∩coNP. Indeed, the strategies
of one player can be used as concise certificates, as observed by Condon [Con92], Paterson and
Zwick [ZP96]. Such games even belong to the class UP∩coUP as shown by Jurdzin´ski [Jur98].
We refer the reader to the discussion in [BSV04, JPZ06] for more information. The arguments of
Condon [Con92] also imply that zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information (and finite
state and action spaces) belong to NP∩coNP. An important subclass of deterministic games with
mean payoff consists of parity games. These can be reduced to mean payoff deterministic games
(Puri [Pur95]), which in turn can be reduced to discounted deterministic games. The latter ones
can be reduced to simple stochastic games (Zwick and Paterson [ZP96]). In [AM09], Andersson
and Miltersen generalized this result showing that stochastic mean payoff games with perfect
information, stochastic parity games and simple stochastic games are polynomial time equivalent.
In particular, the decision problem corresponding to a game of any of these classes lies in the
complexity class of NP∩coNP.
Friedmann has recently constructed an example [Fri09] showing that the Vo¨ge-Jurdjin´sky strat-
egy improvement algorithm for parity games [VJ00] may require an exponential number of iter-
ations. This also yields an exponential lower bound [Fri11] for the Hoffman-Karp strategy im-
provement rule for discounted deterministic games [Pur95]. The result of Friedmann has also
been extended to total reward and undiscounted MDP by Fearnley [Fea10a, Fea10b] and to simple
stochastic games and weighted discounted stochastic games by Andersson [And09].
Moreover, for Markov decision process with a fixed discount factor, some upper bound on the
number of policy iterations was given in [MH86]. Recently, Ye gave a the first strongly polynomial
bound [Ye05, Ye11]. The latter bound has been improved and generalized to zero-sum two player
stochastic games with perfect information factor by Hansen, Miltersen and Zwick in [HMZ11],
again for a fixed discount factor, giving the first strongly polynomial bound for these games. Note
that a polynomial bound for mean payoff games does not follow from these results (to address the
mean payoff case, we need to consider the situation in which the discount factor tends to 1).
Complexity results of a different nature have been established with motivations from numerical
analysis (discretizations of PDE), exploiting in particular the relation between policy iteration and
the Newton method. The policy iteration algorithm for one-player discounted games with an infinite
number of actions has been proved to have a superlinear convergence around the solution under
suitable assumptions (see in particular the works of Puterman and Brumelle [PB79], Akian [Aki90],
and Bokanowski, Maroso, and Zidani [BMZ09]). Chancelier, Messaoud, and Sulem [CMS07] also
considered, in view of their application to quasi-variational inequalities, partially undiscounted
infinite horizon problems for which they proved the contraction of the policy iteration algorithm.
The plan of the paper is the following: Section 2 is recalling some background on stochastic zero-
sum two player games, Section 3 explain the construction of the nonlinear projection, Section 4 gives
the algorithm, its practical version and its proof, Section 5 gives the ingredients of the algorithm,
Section 6 shows an example with possible cycling of iterations when not using the notion of spectral
projector, and Section 7 is for the numerical experiments.
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2 Two player zero-sum stochastic games with discrete time
and mean payoff
The class of two player zero-sum stochastic games was first introduced by Shapley in the early
fifties, see [Sha03]. We recall in this section basic definitions on these games in the case of finite
state space and discrete time (for more details see [Sha03, FV97, Sor02]).
We consider the finite state space [n] := {1, . . . , n}. A stochastic process (ξk)k≥0 on [n] gives
the state of the game at each point time k, called stage. At each of these stages, two players, called
“min” and “max” (the minimizer and the maximizer) have the possibility to influence the course
of the game.
The stochastic game Γ(i0) starting from i0 ∈ [n] is played in stages as follows. The initial state
ξ0 is equal to i0 and known by the players. Player min plays first, and chooses an action α0 in a
set of possible actions Aξ0 . Then the second player, max, chooses an action β0 in a set of possible
actions Bξ0 . The actions of both players and the current state determine the payment r
α0β0
ξ0
made
by min to max and the probability distribution j 7→ Pα0β0ξ0j of the new state ξ1. Then the game
continues in the same way with state ξ1 and so on.
At a stage k, each player chooses an action knowing the history defined by ζk = (ξ0, α0, β0,
· · · , ξk−1, αk−1, βk−1, ξk) for min and (ζk, αk) for max. We call a strategy or policy for a player, a
rule which tells him the action to choose in any situation. There are several classes of strategies.
Assume Ai ⊂ A and Bi ⊂ B for some sets A and B. A behavior or randomized strategy for min
(resp. max) is a sequence σ¯ := (σ0, σ1, · · · ) (resp. δ¯ := (δ0, δ1, · · · )) where σk (resp. δk) is a
map which to a history hk = (i0, a0, b0, . . . , ik−1, ak−1, bk−1, ik) with i` ∈ [n], a` ∈ Ai` , b` ∈ Bi` for
0 ≤ ` ≤ k (resp. (hk, ak)) at stage k associates a probability distribution on a probability space over
A (resp. B) which support is included in the possible actions space Aik (resp. Bik). A Markovian
strategy is a strategy which only depends on the information of the current stage k: σk (resp. δk)
depends only on ik (resp. (ik, ak)), then σk(hk) (resp. σk(hk, ak)) will be denoted σk(ik) (resp.
δk(ik, ak)). It is said stationary if it is independent of k, then σk is also denoted by σ and δk by
δ. A strategy of any type is said pure if for any stage k, the values of σk (resp. δk) are Dirac
probability measures at certain actions in Aik (resp. Bik) then we denote also by σk (resp. δk) the
map which to the history assigns the only possible action in Aik (resp. Bik).
In particular, if σ¯ is a pure Markovian stationary strategy, also called feedback strategy, then
σ¯ = (σk)k≥0 with σk = σ for all k and σ is a map [n] → A such that σ(i) ∈ Ai for all i ∈ [n]. In
this case, we also speak about pure Markovian stationary or feedback strategy for σ and we denote
by AM the set of such maps. We adopt a similar convention for player max : BM := {δ : [n]×A→
B | δ(i, a) ∈ Bi ∀i ∈ [n], a ∈ Ai}.
A strategy σ¯ = (σk)k≥0 (resp. δ¯ = (δk)k≥0) together with an initial state determines stochastic
processes (αk)k≥0 for the actions of min, (βk)k≥0 for the actions of max and (ξk)k≥0 for the states
of the game such that
P (ξk+1 = j | ζk = hk, αk = a, βk = b) = P abij (2a)
P (αk ∈ A′ | ζk = hk) = σk(hk)(A′) (2b)
P (βk ∈ B′ | ζk = hk, αk = a) = δk(hk, a)(B′) , (2c)
where ζk := (ξ0, α0, β0, . . . , ξk−1, αk−1, βk−1ξk) is the history process, hk is a history vector at time
k: hk = (i0, a0, b0, . . . , ik−1, ak−1, bk−1, i) and A′ (resp. B′) are measurable sets in A (resp. B). For
instance, for each pair of feedback strategies (σ, δ) of the two players, that is such that for k ≥ 0 :
σk = σ with σ ∈ AM and δk = δ with δ ∈ BM, the state process (ξk)k≥0 is a Markov chain on [n]
with transition probability
P (ξk+1 = j | ξk = i) = Pσ(i)δ(i,σ(i))ij for i, j ∈ [n] ,
and αk = σ(ξk) and βk = δ(ξk, αk).
When the strategies σ¯ for min and δ¯ for max are fixed, the payoff in finite horizon τ of the
game Γ(i, σ¯, δ¯) starting from i is
Jτ (i, σ¯, δ¯) = Eσ¯δ¯i
[
τ−1∑
k=0
rαkβkξk
]
,
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where Eσ¯,δ¯i denotes the expectation for the probability law determined by (2). The mean payoff of
the game Γ(i, σ¯, δ¯) starting from i is
J(i, σ¯, δ¯) = lim sup
τ→∞
1
τ
Jτ (i, σ¯, δ¯).
When the action spaces Ai and Bi are finite sets for all i ∈ [n], the finite horizon game and the
mean payoff game have a value which is given respectively by:
vτi = inf
σ¯
sup
δ¯
Jτ (i, σ¯, δ¯), (3)
and
ρi = inf
σ¯
sup
δ¯
J(i, σ¯, δ¯), (4)
for all starting state i ∈ [n], where the infimum is taken among all strategies σ¯ for min and the
supremum is taken over all strategies δ¯ for max (see [Sha03] for finite horizon games, and [LL69]
for mean payoff games).
Indeed, the value vτ of the finite horizon game satisfies the dynamic programming equation [Sha03]:
vτ+1i = min
a∈Ai
max
b∈Bi
∑
j∈[n]
P abij v
τ
j + r
ab
i
 , ∀i ∈ [n], (5)
with initial condition v0i = 0, i ∈ [n]. Moreover, optimal strategies are obtained for both players by
taking pure Markovian strategies σ¯ for min and δ¯ for max such that, for all k = 0, . . . , τ−1, and i in
[n], σk(i) attains the minimum in (5) with τ replaced by τ−k−1, and that, for all k = 0, . . . , τ−1,
i in [n] and a in Ai, δk(i, a) attains the maximum in the expression of F (v
τ−k−1; i, a) defined as
follows:
F (v; i, a) = max
b∈Bi
∑
j∈[n]
P abij vj + r
ab
i
 . (6)
We denote by f the dynamic programming or Shapley operator from Rn (that is here equivalent
to R[n]) to itself given by:
[f(v)]i := F (v; i) := min
a∈Ai
F (v; i, a), ∀i ∈ [n], v ∈ Rn. (7)
Then, the dynamic programming equation of the finite horizon game writes:
vτ+1 = f(vτ ). (8)
The operator f is order-preserving, i.e. v ≤ w =⇒ f(v) ≤ f(w) where ≤ denotes the partial
ordering of Rn (v ≤ w if vi ≤ wi for all i ∈ [n]), and additively homogeneous, i.e. it commutes
with the addition of a constant vector, which means that f(λ + v) = λ + f(v) for all λ ∈ R
and v ∈ Rn, where λ + v = (λ + vi)i∈[n]. This implies that f is nonexpansive in the sup-norm
(see for instance [CT80]). Note that it was observed independently by Kolokoltsov [Kol92], by
Gunawardena and Sparrow (see [Gun03]) and by Rubinov and Singer [RS01] that, conversely, if
f : Rn → Rn is order-preserving and additively homogeneous, then f can be put in the form (6,7),
with possibly infinite sets Ai and Bi.
When the action spaces Ai and Bi are finite sets for all i ∈ [n], the map f is also polyhedral,
meaning that there is a covering of Rn by finitely many polyhedra such that the restriction of f
to any of these polyhedra is affine. Kohlberg [Koh80] showed that if f is a polyhedral self-map
of Rn that is nonexpansive in some norm, then, there exist two vectors v and η in Rn such that
f(tη + v) = (t + 1)η + v, for all t ∈ R large enough. A map ω : t ∈ [t0,∞) 7→ tη + v ∈ Rn,
with t0 ∈ R, and η, v ∈ Rn, is called a half-line with slope η. A germ of half-line at infinity is an
equivalence class for the equivalence relation on half-lines ω ∼ ω′ if ω(t) = ω′(t) for t ∈ R large
enough. A germ can be identified with the couple (η, v) of vectors of Rn. Hence, in the sequel, we
shall use the expression “half-line” either for a map ω : t ∈ [t0,∞) 7→ tη + v ∈ Rn, for its germ, or
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for the couple (η, v). We shall say that it is invariant by f if it satisfies the latter property, that is
f(tη+ v) = (t+ 1)η+ v, for all t ∈ R large enough. The interest of an invariant half-line is that its
slope determines the growth rate of the orbits of f , χ(f) := limk→∞ fk(w)/k. Here, fk denotes the
k-th iterate of f , and w is an arbitrary vector of Rn. When it exists, the growth rate χ(f) is called
the cycle time of f . Indeed, if f(tη+v) = (t+1)η+v for t ≥ t0, then fk(t0η+v) = (t0 +k)η+v for
k ≥ 0, hence limk→∞ fk(t0η + v)/k = η, and by the nonexpansiveness of f , limk→∞ fk(w)/k = η
for all w ∈ Rn, that is χ(f) does exist and is equal to η. For the game problem this shows that the
value of the finite horizon game has a linear growth with respect to time:
lim
τ→∞
1
τ
vτi = [χ(f)]i = ηi ,
where f is the Shapley operator defined in (6,7). Moreover, the value ρ of the mean payoff game
defined in (4) coincides with the slope of an invariant half-line of f , and thus with the former limit:
ρi = ηi = [χ(f)]i.
Finally, when the action spaces are finite, one can easily see that the Shapley operator f in (6,7)
satisfies for all η, v ∈ Rn,
f(tη + v) = tfˆ(η) + f´η(v) for t large, (9)
where fˆ is the recession function of f (see [GG04]):
[fˆ(η)]i := lim
t→∞
[f(tη)]i
t
= min
a∈Ai
max
b∈Bi
∑
j∈[n]
P abij ηj
 , i ∈ [n] , (10)
and f´η is what we shall call the tangent of f at infinity around the slope η:
[f´η(v)]i := lim
t→∞[f(tη + v)− tfˆ(η)]i = mina∈A´i,η
max
b∈B´i,a,η
∑
j∈[n]
P abij vj + r
ab
i
 , (11a)
with
A´i,η := argmin
a∈Ai
maxb∈Bi
∑
j∈[n]
P abij ηj
 (11b)
B´i,a,η := argmax
b∈Bi
∑
j∈[n]
P abij ηj
 . (11c)
Indeed, for an action a ∈ Ai and i ∈ [n], we have from the finiteness of the sets Bi :
F (tη + v; i, a) = max
b∈Bi
∑
j∈[n]
P abij (tηj + vj) + r
ab
i

= max
b∈Bi
t ∑
j∈[n]
P abij ηj + P
ab
ij vj + r
ab
i

= max
b∈Bi
t ∑
j∈[n]
P abij ηj
+ max
b∈B´i,a,η
∑
j∈[n]
P abij vj + r
ab
i
 for t large
= t Fˆ (η; i, a) + F´η(v; i, a)
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where one denotes :
Fˆ (η; i, a) := max
b∈Bi
∑
j∈[n]
P abij ηj
 (12)
F´η(v; i, a) := max
b∈B´i,a,η
∑
j∈[n]
P abij vj + r
ab
i
 . (13)
Then, using the finiteness of the sets Ai, and
[f(tη + v)]i = F (tη + v; i) = min
a∈Ai
F (tη + v; i, a) ,
one obtains Equation (9).
From (9), we deduce easily that (η, v) is an invariant half-line of f if, and only if, it satisfies:{
η = fˆ(η) ,
η + v = f´η(v) .
(14)
This couple system of equations is what is solved in practice, when one looks for the value function
ρ = η of the mean payoff game.
3 Reduced super-harmonic vectors
We next present the non-linear analogue of a result of classical potential theory, on which the
policy iteration algorithm for mean payoff games relies. Recall that a self-map f of Rn is order-
preserving if v ≤ w =⇒ f(v) ≤ f(w), where ≤ denotes the partial ordering of Rn, and that it
is additively homogeneous if it commutes with the addition of a constant vector. More generally,
it is additively subhomogeneous, if f(λ + v) ≤ λ + f(v) for all λ ≥ 0 and v ∈ Rn. It is easy to
see that an order-preserving self-map f of Rn is additively subhomogeneous if, and only if, it is
nonexpansive in the sup-norm. (See for instance [GG04] for more background on order-preserving
additively homogeneous maps.)
We shall now recall some definitions and results of [AG03], where the corresponding proofs
can be found, up to an extension from additively homogeneous maps to subhomogeneous maps as
in [AG03, §1.4]. To show the analogy with potential theory, we shall say that a vector u ∈ Rn
is harmonic with respect to an order preserving, additively (sub)homogeneous map g of Rn if it
is a fixed point of g, i.e. if g(u) = u, and that it is super-harmonic if g(u) ≤ u. ([AG03] deals
more generally with additive eigenvectors and super-eigenvectors). We shall denote by H (g) and
H +(g) the set of harmonic and super-harmonic vectors respectively.
We say that a self-map g of Rn is convex if all its coordinates gi : Rn → R are convex functions.
Then, the subdifferential of g at a point u ∈ Rn is defined as
∂g(u) := {M ∈ Rn×n | g(v)− g(u) ≥M(v − u), ∀v ∈ Rn} .
Hence,
∂g(u) = {M ∈ Rn×n | Mi. ∈ ∂gi(u)} , (15)
where Mi. denotes the i-th row of the matrix M . It can be checked that when g is order-preserving
and additively homogeneous (resp. subhomogeneous), ∂g(u) consists of stochastic (resp. substochas-
tic) matrices, that is matrices with nonnegative entries and row sums equal to 1 (resp. less or equal
to 1), see [AG03, Cor. 2.2 and (4)]. Assume g has a harmonic vector u. We say that a node is
critical if it belongs to a recurrence class of some matrix M ∈ ∂g(u), where a recurrence class of
M means a (final) communication class F of M such that the F ×F submatrix of M is stochastic
(note that a recurrence class may not exist if g is not additively homogeneous), see [AG03, §2.3
and 1.4]. One defines also the critical graph Gc(g) of g as the union of the graphs of the F × F
submatrices of the matrices M ∈ ∂g(u), such that F is a recurrence class of M . The set of critical
nodes and the critical graph of g are independent of the choice of the harmonic vector u [AG03,
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Prop. 2.5]. Indeed, when g arises from a stochastic control problem with ergodic reward, a node is
critical iff it is recurrent for some stationary optimal strategy.
If I is any subset of [n], we denote by rI the restriction from Rn to RI , such that (rIv)i := vi,
for all i ∈ I. For all u ∈ Rn, we define uI := rIu, and for all self-maps g of Rn, we define gI := rI ◦g.
Let J := [n] \ I. We denote by ıI the canonical map identifying RI ×RJ to Rn, which sends (w, z)
to the vector u such that ui = wi for all i ∈ I and ui = zi for all i ∈ J . Then, the transpose r∗I
of rI is the map from RI to Rn such that r∗I (w) = ıI(w, 0). Finally, for all I, J ⊂ [n], and for all
n× n matrices M , we denote by MIJ the I × J submatrix of M .
Lemma 1. Let g denote a convex, order preserving, and additively homogeneous self-map of Rn.
Assume that u ∈ Rn is harmonic with respect to g. Denote by C the set of critical nodes of g and by
N = [n] \C its complement in [n]. Then, the map h : RN → RN with h(w) := (rN ◦ g ◦ ıN )(w, uC)
has a unique fixed point.
Proof. Since the map g is order preserving and additively homogeneous, it is nonexpansive in the
sup-norm, and so, the map h is also order preserving and nonexpansive in the sup-norm, hence it
is additively subhomogeneous. Since u is harmonic with respect to g, that is a fixed point of g,
uN is a fixed point of the map h. A classical result of convex analysis (Theorem 23.9 of [Roc70])
shows in particular that if G is a finite valued convex function defined on Rd, if A is a linear map
Rp → Rd, and if H(v) := G(Av), then, ∂H(v) = A∗∂G(Av). Applying this result to every convex
map Gi defined on Rn such that Gi(w) := gi(w + ıN (0, uC)), with i ∈ N , and to the linear map
A = r∗N , we deduce that ∂hi(uN ) is the projection on RN of the subdifferential of Gi at the point
r∗N (uN ), or equivalently of the subdifferential of gi at the point r
∗
N (uN ) + ıN (0, uC) = ı(uN , uC) =
u. Using (15), this implies that ∂h(uN ) = {MNN | M ∈ ∂g(u)}. Since g is order preserving
and additively homogeneous, the elements of ∂g(u) are stochastic matrices, and by the above
equality, or since h is order preserving and additively subhomogeneous, the elements of ∂h(uN ) are
substochastic matrices. Recall that the set of critical nodes of h is defined as the set of nodes that
belong to a final class F of some matrix P ∈ ∂h(uN ) satisfying that PFF is stochastic. Denote by
F such a class. We have F ⊂ N . Moreover, since ∂h(uN ) = {MNN | M ∈ ∂g(u)}, we can find
a matrix Q ∈ ∂g(u) the N ×N submatrix of which, QNN , coincides with P . Since F ⊂ N , QFF
coincides with PFF . Hence QFF is a stochastic matrix, which implies that F is a recurrent class
of Q. This shows that the nodes of F are critical nodes of g, which contradicts the fact that the
set of critical nodes is C since F ⊂ N = [n] \ C. Therefore the set of critical nodes of h is empty.
It follows from Corollary 1.3 of [AG03] that h has a unique fixed point.
We shall need the following result of [AG03].
Lemma 2 ([AG03, (7) and Lemma 3.3]). Let g be a convex order-preserving additively homogeneous
self-map of Rn, with at least one harmonic vector. Denote by C the set of critical nodes. If u is
super-harmonic with respect to g, then g(u) = u on C, and gω(u) := limk→∞ gk(u) exists, is
harmonic with respect to g and coincides with u on C. Moreover, the map gω : H +(g) → H (g)
is order-preserving, additively homogeneous, convex, and is a projector.
The following result gives other characterizations of gω(u) that allows one to compute it effi-
ciently.
Theorem 3. Let g denote a convex, order preserving, and additively homogeneous self-map of Rn.
Assume that g admits at least one harmonic vector. Let C denote the set of critical nodes of g,
and let N denote its complement in [n], N = [n] \C. For a super-harmonic vector u, the following
conditions define uniquely the same vector v:
(i) v = gω(u) := limk→∞ gk(u);
(ii) v is harmonic and coincides with u on C;
(iii) v coincides with u on C and its restriction to N is a fixed point of the map h : w 7→
(rN ◦ g ◦ ıN )(w, uC);
(iv) v is the smallest super-harmonic vector that dominates u on C.
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Proof. (i)⇒(ii): This follows from Lemma 2.
(ii)⇒(iii): Assume that the vector v is harmonic and coincides with u on C and let h be defined
as in Point (iii). Then, vN = h(vN ), showing that vN is a fixed point of h.
(iii)⇒(i): Let v and h be as in Point (iii), hence vC = uC and vN is a fixed point of h. By Lemma 2,
w := gω(u) is harmonic with respect to g and wC = uC . Applying Lemma 1 to g and w (instead
of u), and using wC = uC , we get that the fixed point of h is unique, and thus equal to wN . This
shows that vN = wN , and since vC = uC = wC , we get that v = w = g
ω(u), that is Point (i).
(ii)⇒(iv): Let v be as in Point (ii). Since v is harmonic and coincides with u on C, it is super-
harmonic and dominates u on C. By ((ii)⇒(iii)), vN is a fixed point of h, with h as in Point
(iii). Assume now that w is super-harmonic and dominates u on C, that is wC ≥ uC . Then,
w ≥ g(w), and since g is order preserving, wN ≥ gN (wN , wC) ≥ gN (wN , uC) = h(wN ). Since h
is order-preserving, we deduce from wN ≥ h(wN ) that wN ≥ h1(wN ) ≥ h2(wN ) ≥ · · · . Since h is
nonexpansive and admits a fixed point, every orbit of h is bounded. Hence, hk(wN ) has a limit as
k tends to infinity, and this limit is a fixed point of h. Applying Lemma 1 to g and v (instead of
u), and using vC = uC , we get that the fixed point of h is unique and equal to vN . It follows that
wN ≥ vN . Since v coincides with u on C and wC ≥ uC , we deduce that w ≥ v. This shows that v
is the smallest super-harmonic vector that dominates u on C.
(iv)⇒(ii): Let v be a minimal super-harmonic vector that dominates u on C (or the smallest one
if it exists). Since v is a super-harmonic vector, that is g(v) ≤ v, and g is order-preserving, we get
that g(g(v)) ≤ g(v), which shows that g(v) is also super-harmonic. Moreover, by Lemma 2, g(v)
coincides with v on C, hence it dominates u on C. Since g(v) ≤ v, the minimality of v implies
g(v) = v, which shows that v is harmonic. Since u and v are super-harmonic vectors and g is
order-preserving, we get that the infimum v ∧ u of v and u is also a super-harmonic vector. Since
v dominates u on C, we get that v∧u equals u on C. Hence by the minimality of v, and v∧u ≤ v,
we obtain that v = v∧u, hence v ≤ u. This implies that v equals u on C, hence v satisfies (ii).
Let gω be defined as in Theorem 3. When g(v) = Mv is a linear operator, and M is a
stochastic matrix, gω(u) coincides with the reduced super-harmonic vector of u with respect to the
set C. When g is a max-plus linear operator, the operator gω coincides with the spectral projector
which has been defined in the max-plus literature, see [CTGG99]. For this reason, we call gω the
(nonlinear) spectral projector of g.
We now define a spectral projector acting on half-lines. We assume that g is a polyhedral,
convex, order preserving, and additively homogeneous self-map of Rn. This implies in particular
that for all i ∈ [n], the domain of the Legendre-Fenchel transform g∗i of the coordinate gi of g is
included in the set of stochastic vectors, and that gi is the Legendre-Fenchel transform of g
∗
i , hence
can be put in the same form as in (6):
gi(v) = max
b∈Bi
∑
j∈[n]
P bij vj + r
b
i
 , (16)
where, for all i ∈ [n], P bi. ∈ Rn is a stochastic vector, rbi ∈ R, and Bi is the domain of g∗i , see [AG03,
Prop. 2.1 and Cor. 2.2]. Since the map gi is polyhedral, the domain of g
∗
i is also a polyhedral
convex set, see [Roc70, Th. 19.2], and since it is included in the set of stochastic vectors, it is
compact, hence it is the convex envelope of the finite set of its extremals. Then, in (16), Bi can
be replaced by this finite set.
Since g is polyhedral, order preserving, and additively homogeneous, we get by Kohlberg theo-
rem [Koh80] recalled in Section 2, that g has an invariant half-line (η, v), η is necessarily equal to
χ(g), and by (14), v and η satisfy η = gˆ(η) and η + v = g´η(v), where gˆ and g´η are defined in (10)
and (11a) respectively. When g is given by (16), these maps can be rewritten as:
[gˆ(η)]i = max
b∈Bi
∑
j∈[n]
P bij ηj
 , i ∈ [n] , (17)
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and
[g´η(v)]i = max
b∈B´i,η
∑
j∈[n]
P bij vj + r
b
i
 , (18a)
B´i,η := argmax
b∈Bi
∑
j∈[n]
P bij ηj
 . (18b)
Let us fix an invariant half-line (η, v) of g. Denote g¯(w) := g´η(w)− η, then v is harmonic with
respect to g¯: g¯(v) = v. We define the set of critical nodes of g, C(g), to be the set of critical
nodes of g¯. A half-line w : t 7→ tη + v is super-invariant if g ◦ w(t) ≤ w(t+ 1), for t large enough.
From (9), this property is equivalent to the conditions η ≥ gˆ(η) with vi ≥ g¯i(v) when ηi = gˆi(η).
In particular when the equality η = gˆ(η) holds, it is equivalent to v ≥ g¯(v).
Corollary 1. Assume that g is a polyhedral, convex, order preserving, and additively homogeneous
self-map of Rn. Assume that w : t 7→ tη+v is a super-invariant half-line of g with η = χ(g). Then,
there exists a unique invariant half-line of g which coincides with w on the set of critical nodes of
g. It is given by t 7→ tη + g¯ω(v), where g¯ : w 7→ g´η(w)− η.
Proof. As said above, an invariant half-line of g must be of the form t 7→ tη + z, where η = χ(g)
and z ∈ Rn is a fixed point of g¯. If w : t 7→ tη + v is a super-invariant half-line of g with η = χ(g),
then η = gˆ(η), and by (9), we get v ≥ g¯(v). From this, we deduce that t 7→ tη + z is an invariant
half-line of g which coincides with w on C, if and only if z is harmonic with respect to g¯ and
coincides with v on C. By Theorem 3, g¯ω(v) is such a harmonic vector, and it is the unique one.
The corollary follows.
For any super-invariant half-line w of g with η = χ(g), we define gω(w) to be the half-line
t 7→ tη + g¯ω(v).
4 Policy iteration algorithm for stochastic mean payoff games
The following policy iteration scheme was introduced by Cochet-Terrasson and Gaubert in [CTG06].
We first give, in Algorithm 1, an abstract formulation of the algorithm similar to the one given
in [CTG06], which is convenient to establish its convergence. A detailed practical algorithm will
follow and the proof of the convergence of the algorithm will be given in the last subsection.
4.1 The theoretical algorithm
In order to present the algorithm, we assume that every coordinate of f : Rn → Rn is given by:
fi(v) = min
a∈Ai
fai (v) , (19)
where Ai is a finite set, and f
a
i is a polyhedral order preserving, additively homogeneous, and
convex map from Rn to R. These conditions all together are indeed equivalent to the property
that f is of the form (6,7), since as already observed any polyhedral order preserving, additively
homogeneous and convex map g from Rn to R can be put in the form (16), with Bi a finite set.
For all feedback strategies σ ∈ AM = {σ : [n]→ A, i 7→ σ(i) ∈ Ai}, we denote by f (σ) the self-map
of Rn the i-th coordinate of which is given by f (σ)i = f
σ(i)
i .
Algorithm 1 (Policy iteration for multichain mean payoff two player games [CTG06]).
Input : A map f the coordinates of which are of the form (19).
Output : An invariant half-line w : t 7→ tη + v of f and an optimal policy σ ∈ AM.
1. Initialization: Set k = 0. Select an arbitrary strategy σ0 ∈ AM. Compute an invariant
half-line of f (σ0), w(0) : t 7→ tη(0) + v(0).
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2. If f ◦w(k)(t) = w(k)(t+ 1) holds for t large enough, the algorithm stops and returns w(k) and
σk.
3. Otherwise, improve the strategy σk for w
(k), by selecting a strategy σk+1 such that f◦w(k)(t) =
f (σk+1) ◦w(k)(t), for t large enough. The choice of σk+1 must be conservative, meaning that,
for all i ∈ [n], σk+1(i) = σk(i) if fi ◦ w(k)(t) = f (σk)i ◦ w(k)(t), for t large enough.
4. Compute an arbitrary invariant half-line w′(t) : t 7→ tη(k+1) + v′ of f (σk+1). If η(k+1) 6= η(k)
then set v(k+1) = v′, i.e. w(k+1) = w′, and go to step 6. Otherwise (η(k+1) = η(k)), we say
that the iteration is degenerate.
5. Compute the invariant half-line w(k+1) = (f (σk+1))ω(w(k)) of f (σk+1), and define v(k+1) and
η(k+1) by w(k+1)(t) = tη(k+1) + v(k+1).
6. Increment k by one and go to step 2.
Let us give some details about the well posedness of this algorithm. First, the existence of
the invariant half-lines in Steps 1 and 4 follows from Kohlberg theorem [Koh80] applied to the
polyhedral order preserving additively homogeneous maps f (σk) with k ≥ 1. Second, due to the
finiteness of the action sets Ai and the fact that the maps f
a
i are polyhedral, the maps f and f
a
i can
be rewritten in the form (9). Hence, the test of Step 2 and the asymptotic optimization problem of
Step 3 can be rewritten as an equality test for (germs of) half-lines and the pointwise minimization
of a finite set of half-lines, which are transformed into systems of equations and lexicographical
optimization problems, using the representation of half-lines as couples (η, v) instead of maps
w : t 7→ tη + v, see the following section for details.
Finally, at each iteration k of Algorithm 1, w(k) : t 7→ tη(k) + v(k) is a super-invariant half-line
of f (σk+1). Indeed, by construction of σk+1, and since w
(k) is an invariant half-line of f (σk), we get
f (σk+1)(w(k)(t)) = f(w(k)(t)) ≤ f (σk)(w(k)(t)) = w(k)(t+ 1) , (20)
for t large enough. Moreover, since w(k) is an invariant half-line of f (σk), we have χ(f (σk)) = η(k).
Hence, in Step 5, w(k) is a super-invariant half-line of f (σk+1) with slope η(k) equal to η(k+1) =
χ(f (σk+1)). By Corollary 1, there exists a unique invariant half-line of f (σk+1) which coincides
with w(k) on the set of critical nodes of f (σk+1) and it is given by w(k+1) = (f (σk+1))ω(w(k)) :
t 7→ tη(k+1) + v(k+1) with v(k+1) =
(
f (σk+1)
)ω
(v(k)). Practical computations are detailed in the
following sections.
4.2 The practical algorithm
All the steps of Algorithm 1 involve equality tests or pointwise minimizations of half-lines. However,
it would not be robust to do these tests on half-lines just by choosing an arbitrary large number
t in the equations and inequations to be solved. We shall rather use the equivalence between the
representation of a half-line as a map w : t 7→ tη + v with t large and that as a couple (η, v). This
allows one to transform all the tests into systems of equations or optimizations of finite sets of
half-lines for the pointwise lexicographic order (which is linear, for each coordinate). This means
that we are solving the system of equations (14). Then, using the notations of Section 2, the
corresponding practical algorithm of the formal Algorithm 1 is given below in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 (Policy iteration for multichain mean payoff two player games).
Input : A map f the coordinates of which are of the form (19) and the notations (7,6) and (11–
13).
Output : An invariant half-line (η, v) of f and an optimal policy σ ∈ AM.
1. Initialization: Set k = 0. Select an arbitrary strategy σ0 ∈ AM. Compute the couple (η(0),
v(0)) solution of {
η
(0)
i = Fˆ (η
(0); i, σ0(i))
η
(0)
i + v
(0)
i = F´η(0)(v
(0); i, σ0(i))
for all i ∈ [n] . (21)
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2. If η(k) and v(k) satisfy System (14), or equivalently if σk+1 = σk is solution of (22) below,
then the algorithm stops and returns (η(k), v(k)) and σk.
3. Otherwise, improve the policy σk ∈ AM for (η(k), v(k)) in a conservative way, that is choose
σk+1 ∈ AM such that σk+1(i) ∈ argmina∈A´i,η(k)
{
F´η(k)(v
(k); i, a)
}
σk+1(i) = σk(i) if σk(i) is optimal,
for all i ∈ [n] . (22)
4. Compute a couple (η(k+1), v′) for policy σk+1 solution of{
η
(k+1)
i = Fˆ (η
(k+1); i, σk+1(i))
η
(k+1)
i + v
′
i = F´η(k+1)(v
′; i, σk+1(i))
for all i ∈ [n] . (23)
If η(k+1) 6= η(k) then set v(k+1) = v′ and go to step 6. Otherwise, the iteration is degenerate.
5.i) Let g := f (σk+1) (gi = F (·; i, σk+1(i))). Compute C(g) the set of critical nodes of the map
g¯ defined by : g¯ = g´η(k+1)(·)− η(k+1), or equivalently:
g¯i(v) = F´η(k+1)(v; i, σk+1(i))− η(k+1)i for all i ∈ [n] ,
for which v′ is a harmonic vector.
5.ii) Compute v(k+1) = g¯ω(v(k)), that is the solution of:{
v
(k+1)
i = F´η(k+1)(v
(k+1); i, σk+1(i))− η(k+1)i i ∈ [n] \ C(g)
v
(k+1)
i = v
(k)
i i ∈ C(g) .
(24)
6. Increment k by one and go to Step 2.
It remains to precise how the steps are performed. Step 3 is just composed of lexicographic
optimization problems in finite sets. The systems (21) and (23) are the dynamic programming
equations of a one player multichain mean payoff game, they can be computed by applying the
policy iteration algorithm for multichain Markov decision processes with mean payoff introduced by
Howard [How60] and Denardo and Fox [DF68]. Note that one can also choose to solve Systems (21)
and (23) by applying Algorithm 2 to the maps h = f (σ0) and h = f (σk+1) respectively, while
replacing minimizations by maximizations, but in that case the algorithm is almost equivalent to
that of Howard [How60] and Denardo and Fox [DF68], see Section 5 below. In Step 5, the set of
critical nodes of g, that is that of g¯, can be computed using a variant of the algorithm proposed
in [AG03, § 6.3] described in Section 5.3. Finally, System (24) is the dynamic programming equation
of an optimal control problem with infinite horizon stopped when reaching the set C(g) which can
be solved using the original policy iteration algorithm of Howard [How60]. We shall recall all these
algorithms in Section 5.
4.3 Convergence of the algorithm
In this subsection, we show in Theorem 7 that Algorithm 1, or equivalently Algorithm 2 termi-
nates after a finite number of steps. This result is proved using Theorem 3. Let first show some
intermediate results.
The following lemma is known, see for instance Sorin [Sor04].
Lemma 4 (See [Sor04]). Let g denote an order preserving self-map of Rn, that is nonexpansive
in the sup-norm, and has a cycle time χ(g). If w : t 7→ tη + v is a super-invariant half-line of g,
then, χ(g) ≤ η.
Proof. We reproduce the argument, for completeness: if w : t 7→ tη+v is a super-invariant half-line
of g, that is g(w(t)) ≤ w(t+ 1) for t ≥ t0 for some t0 ≥ 0, then, gk(w(t)) ≤ w(t+ k), for all k ≥ 0,
and t ≥ t0, and so χ(g) ≤ limk→∞ w(t0 + k)/k = η, which shows Lemma 4.
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Since, by (20), w(k) is a super-invariant half-line of f (σk+1), with slope η(k) = χ(f (σk)), it follows
from Lemma 4 that :
Lemma 5. The sequence of strategies defined in Algorithm 1 is such that
χ(f (σk+1)) ≤ χ(f (σk)) .
We now examine degenerate iterations.
Lemma 6. Let (σk)k≥1 be the sequence of strategies defined in Algorithm 1, and assume that
χ(f (σk+1)) = χ(f (σk)). Then, the following statements hold.
1. The half-line w(k+1) agrees with w(k) on the set of critical nodes of f (σk+1).
2. Every critical node of f (σk+1) is a critical node of f (σk).
3. w(k+1) ≤ w(k).
Proof. Let us use the notations: g := f (σk+1) (as in Algorithm 2) and h = f (σk). By construction
and assumption, we have η(k) = χ(h) = χ(g) = η(k+1), that we shall also denote by η.
Point 1: Since, by (20), w(k) is a super-invariant half-line of g, with slope η(k) = χ(g), and since
w(k+1) is defined as gω(w(k)), the result follows from Corollary 1.
Point 2: Again, since w(k) is a super-invariant half-line of g, with slope η(k) = χ(g), we deduce
from the definition of g¯ and (9), that
g¯(v(k)) ≤ v(k) . (25)
Then by Lemma 2, g¯(v(k)) agrees with v(k) on C(g¯) = C(g), the set of critical nodes of g, and so,
the equality g(w(k)(t)) = w(k)(t+1) holds on C(g) for t large. Since w(k) is an invariant half line of
f (σk), we get that fi(w
(k)(t)) = f
(σk+1)
i (w
(k)(t)) = w(k)(t + 1) = f
(σk)
i (w
(k)(t)) for t large enough
and i ∈ C(g). Hence, the conservative selection rule ensures that σk+1(i) = σk(i) for all i ∈ C(g).
This implies that gi = hi for all i ∈ C(g), and since χ(g) = χ(h), we get from the definitions of g¯
and h¯ that
g¯i = h¯i for all i ∈ C(g) . (26)
Observe that v(k+1) is a fixed-point of g¯, and that g¯ is a polyhedral additively homogeneous order
preserving convex selfmap of Rn. Hence the critical nodes of g¯ are the indices that belong to a
final class of a matrix M ∈ ∂g¯(v(k+1)) (since the elements of g¯(v(k+1)) are stochastic matrices,
all their final classes are recurrent). Let F be such a final class. From (15), the line Mi· ∈
∂g¯i(v
(k+1)) for i ∈ F , that is g¯i(v) − g¯i(v(k+1)) ≥ Mi·(v − v(k+1)) for all v ∈ Rn. Since v(k+1)
is a fixed point of g¯, v(k) a fixed point of h¯, and v(k+1) agrees with v(k) on C(g) (from Point 1),
we get that g¯i(v
(k+1)) = v
(k+1)
i = v
(k)
i = h¯i(v
(k)) for all i ∈ C(g). From (26), we deduce that
g¯i(v) − g¯i(v(k+1)) = h¯i(v) − h¯i(v(k)) for all i ∈ C(g) and v ∈ Rn. Now, since F is a final class of
M , hence F ⊂ C(g), and Mij = 0 for i ∈ F and j 6∈ C(g), we get that Mi·v(k+1) = Mi·v(k) for
i ∈ F . This implies that h¯i(v)− h¯i(v(k)) ≥Mi·(v−v(k)) for all v ∈ Rn and i ∈ F , which shows that
Mi· ∈ ∂h¯i(v(k)) for i ∈ F . Let N := [n] \ F and define the matrix Q such that Qi· = Mi· if i ∈ F ,
and Qi· be any element of ∂h¯i(v(k)) if i ∈ N , then Q ∈ ∂h¯(v(k)). Hence, the F × F submatrix of
M is also a F × F submatrix of Q, and so F is a final class of Q. Since v(k) is a fixed point of h¯,
this implies that F is included in the set of critical nodes of h¯, which is also by definition the set
of critical nodes of h. This shows that all critical nodes of g are also critical nodes of h, and shows
Point 2.
Point 3: From (25), we get that g¯(v(k)) ≤ v(k), hence the sequence g¯k(v(k)) is nonincreasing and
g¯ω(v(k)) ≤ v(k). Since η(k) = η(k+1), we get that w(k+1) = gω(w(k)) = tη(k) + g¯(v(k)) ≤ w(k).
Finally, we prove that the algorithm terminates.
Theorem 7. A strategy cannot be selected twice in Algorithm 1, and so, the algorithm terminates
after a finite number of iterations.
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Proof. Assume by contradiction that the same strategy is selected twice in Algorithm 1, that is
σs = σm for some iterations 1 ≤ s < m of the algorithm before it stops. Then, χ(f (σs)) = χ(f (σm))
and since by Lemma 5, χ(f (σs)) ≥ χ(f (σs+1)) ≥ · · · ≥ χ(f (σm)), we get the equality χ(f (σs)) =
χ(f (σs+1)) = · · · = χ(f (σm)). Hence, by Lemma 6, Part 2, we have that C(f (σm)) ⊂ C(f (σm−1)) ⊂
· · · ⊂ C(f (σs)) and since σs = σm, we get the equality C(f (σm)) = C(f (σm−1)) = · · · = C(f (σs)).
So by Lemma 6, Part 1, w(s) and w(m) are both invariant half-lines of f (σs) with slope χ(f (σs)),
that agree on C(f (σs)). Hence by Corollary 1, w(s) = w(m). Since by Lemma 6, Part 3, we have
w(s) ≥ w(s+1) ≥ · · · ≥ w(m), it follows that w(s) = · · · = w(m). In particular, w(s) = w(s+1).
Hence, w(s)(t+ 1) = w(s+1)(t+ 1) = f (σs+1) ◦ w(s+1)(t) = f (σs+1) ◦ w(s)(t) = f ◦ w(s)(t) for t large
enough. It follows that w(s) is an invariant half-line of f , and so, the algorithm stops at step s,
which contradicts the existence of iteration m, and so the same strategy cannot be selected twice
in Algorithm 1.
Since the sets Ai are finite, the number of strategies (the elements of AM) is also finite, and
since a strategy cannot be selected twice, Algorithm 1 stops after a finite number of iterations,
that is bounded by the number of strategies.
5 Ingredients of Algorithm 1 or 2: one player games algo-
rithms
As said in Section 4.2, each basic step of the policy iteration algorithm for multichain mean payoff
zero-sum two player games (Algorithm 1 or 2) concerns the solution of one player games, also called
stochastic control problems or Markov decision processes, with finite state and action spaces:
a mean payoff problem for Systems (21) and (23), an infinite horizon problem stopped at the
boundary for System (24), and the set of critical nodes of the corresponding dynamic programming
operator in Step 5. We recall here the policy iteration algorithm for solving stochastic control
problems, with either infinite horizon or mean payoff, and the algorithm proposed in [AG03, § 6.3]
for computing a critical graph, and explain how all these algorithms are applied in Algorithm 1 or 2.
By doing so, we shall also see that the classical Howard / Denardo-Fox algorithm can be thought
of as a special case of these algorithms, in which the second player has no choices of actions.
In all the section, we consider the following dynamic programming or Shapley operator of a one
player game with finite state and action spaces: g is a map from Rn to itself, given by :
[g(v)]i := max
b∈Bi
G(v; i, b) ∀i ∈ [n], v ∈ Rn , (27)
where
G(v; i, b) =
∑
j∈[n]
P bij vj + r
b
i , (28)
the vectors P bi· are substochastic vectors, for all i ∈ [n] and b ∈ Bi, and Bi are finite sets, for all
i ∈ [n]. Equivalently, g is a convex additively subhomogeneous order preserving polyhedral selfmap
of Rn.
Since player min does not exist, the set of feedback strategies for player max, BM, is given by
BM := {δ : [n] → B | δ(i) ∈ Bi ∀i ∈ [n]}, where B contains all the sets Bi. For each δ ∈ BM, we
denote by g(δ) the self-map of Rn given by:
g
(δ)
i (v) := G(v; i, δ(i)) ∀i ∈ [n], v ∈ Rn .
We also denote by r(δ) the vector of Rn such that r(δ)i = r
δ(i)
i and P
(δ) the n× n matrix such that
P
(δ)
ij = P
(δ(i))
ij , then g
(δ) : v 7→ P (δ)v + r(δ).
5.1 Policy iterations for one player games with discounted payoff
System (24) consists in finding the solution v of the equation v = g¯(v) with v = u on C(g¯) where
u ∈ Rn is super-harmonic with respect to g¯, g¯(u) ≤ u, and g is as in (27) with (28). The solution
v is thus the value of a one player game with infinite horizon stopped when reaching the set C(g¯)
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whose transition probabilities are given by the P bij , instantaneous reward is given by the r
b
i and
final reward is given by ui, when the game is in state i ∈ C(g¯). This value function can be
obtained using the classical policy iteration algorithm of Howard [How60] for a one player game.
From Theorem 3, v is solution of the above equation, if and only if vC = uC and vN is a fixed
point of the convex polyhedral additively subhomogeneous order preserving selfmap h of RN , with
C = C(g¯), N = [n] \ C, and h defined as in Theorem 3, Point (iii), with g replaced by g¯. One can
also consider the equivalent equation v = h(v) with hi = g¯i for i ∈ N and hi(v) = ui for i ∈ C
and v ∈ Rn. In that case, h is a convex polyhedral additively subhomogeneous order preserving
selfmap of Rn.
In these two settings, we need to solve an equation of the form v = g(v), where g is of the
form (27), and g has no critical node: C(g) = ∅. From [AG03, Corollary 1.3], g has a unique fixed
point and all the maps g(δ) with δ ∈ BM have a unique fixed point (since their critical nodes are
necessarily critical nodes of g). The policy iteration algorithm of Howard applied to this equation
is then given by Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 (Policy iteration of Howard [How60] for stochastic control problems).
Input : A map g of the form (27) with no critical node.
Output : The fixed point of g and an optimal policy δ ∈ BM.
1. Initialization: Set k = 0. Select an arbitrary strategy δ0 ∈ BM.
2. Compute the value of the game v(k) with fixed feedback strategy δk, that is the solution of
the linear system:
v(k) = g(δk)(v(k)) .
3. If v(k) = g(v(k)), or equivalently if δk+1 = δk is solution of (29) below, then the algorithm
stops and returns v(k) and δk.
4. Otherwise, improve the policy δk+1 ∈ BM for the value v(k) :
δk+1(i) ∈ argmax
b∈Bi
G(v(k); i, b) ∀i ∈ [n]. (29)
5. Increment k by one and go to Step 2.
It is known [How60] that v(k+1) ≤ v(k) and that the algorithm stops after a finite number of
steps.
5.2 Policy iteration for multichain one player games
Consider a one player game with dynamic programming operator g given by (27) and mean payoff.
Then, as explained in Section 2 in the more general two player case, the mean payoff of the game
is the slope η of any invariant half line (η, v) of g, which is also any solution of the following couple
system (see Equation (14)): {
η = gˆ(η)
η + v = g´η(v) .
(30)
where gˆ and g´η are defined in (10) and (11) respectively. In the present one player case, they are
reduced to:
[gˆ(η)]i := max
b∈Bi
Gˆ(η; i, b) and [g´η(v)]i := max
b∈B´i,η
G(v; i, b) , (31)
with
Gˆ(η; i, b) =
∑
j∈[n]
P bij ηj and B´i,η := argmax
b∈Bi
∑
j∈[n]
P bij ηj
 , (32)
for all η, v ∈ Rn, i ∈ [n], b ∈ B. We refer also to [DF68, Put94] for the existence of solutions to
System (30), and for the proof that η solution of this system is the mean payoff of the game in this
one player context. The following algorithm for multichain mean payoff Markov decision processes
was introduced by Howard [How60] and proved to converge by Denardo and Fox [DF68]:
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Algorithm 4 (Policy iteration algorithm for multichain mean payoff one player games).
Input : A map g of the form (27) with (28), and the notations (31,32).
Output : An invariant half-line (η, v) of g and an optimal policy δ ∈ BM.
1. Initialization: Set k = 0. Select an arbitrary strategy δ0 ∈ BM.
2. For each final class F of P (δk), denote by iF the minimal index of the elements of F , and
define S as the set of all these indices iF . Compute the couple (η
(k), v(k)) for policy δk
solution of 
η
(k)
i = Gˆ(η
(k); i, δk(i)) i ∈ [n] \ S
η
(k)
i + v
(k)
i = G(v
(k); i, δk(i)) i ∈ [n]
v
(k)
i = 0 i ∈ S .
(33)
3. If (η(k), v(k)) is solution of (30), or equivalently if δk+1 = δk is solution of (34) below, then
the algorithm stops and returns (η(k), v(k)) and δk.
4. Otherwise, improve the policy δk+1 ∈ BM for (η(k), v(k)) in a conservative way, that is choose
δk+1 ∈ BM such that : δk+1(i) ∈ argmaxb∈B´i,η(k) G(v
(k); i, b)
δk+1(i) = δk(i) if δk(i) is optimal,
for all i ∈ [n] . (34)
5. Increment k by one and go to Step 2.
The justifications and details of Algorithm 4 can be found in [DF68, Put94] and are recalled in
Appendix. Solving System (33) turns out to be a critical step. This can be optimized by exploiting
the structure of the system, we discuss this issue in Appendix. As explained in Section 4.2, another
way to solve a multichain mean payoff Markov decision process may be to use Algorithm 1 or 2 in
the particular case of a one-player game, with maximizations instead of minimizations. In order to
compare it with Algorithm 4, we rewrite below Algorithm 2 in that case, with the above notations.
Note that in the one-player case, the map g of Step 5 of Algorithm 2 is affine, hence its critical
graph reduces to the final graph of its tangent matrix.
Algorithm 5 (Specialization of Algorithm 2 to the one player case).
Input : A map g of the form (27) with (28), and the notations (31,32).
Output : An invariant half-line (η, v) of g and an optimal policy δ ∈ BM.
1. Initialization: Set k = 0. Select an arbitrary strategy δ0 ∈ BM. Compute the couple (η(0),
v(0)) solution of {
η
(0)
i = Gˆ(η
(0); i, δ0(i))
η
(0)
i + v
(0)
i = G(v
(0); i, δ0(i))
for all i ∈ [n] . (35)
2. If η(k) and v(k) satisfy System (30), or equivalently if δk+1 = δk is solution of (36) below,
then the algorithm stops and returns (η(k), v(k)) and δk.
3. Otherwise, improve the policy δk ∈ BM for (η(k), v(k)) in a conservative way, that is choose
δk+1 ∈ BM such that δk+1(i) ∈ argmaxb∈B´i,η(k) G(v
(k); i, b)
δk+1(i) = δk(i) if δk(i) is optimal,
for all i ∈ [n] . (36)
4. Compute a couple (η(k+1), v′) for policy δk+1 solution of{
η
(k+1)
i = Gˆ(η
(k+1); i, δk+1(i))
η
(k+1)
i + v
′
i = G(v
′; i, δk+1(i))
for all i ∈ [n] . (37)
If η(k+1) 6= η(k) then set v(k+1) = v′ and go to step 6. Otherwise, the iteration is degenerate.
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5.i) Compute C the set of final nodes of the matrix P (δk+1).
5.ii) Compute the solution v(k+1) of:{
v
(k+1)
i = G(v
(k+1); i, δk+1(i))− η(k+1)i i ∈ [n] \ C
v
(k+1)
i = v
(k)
i i ∈ C .
(38)
6. Increment k by one and go to Step 2.
Systems (35) and (37) are of the form:{
η = P η
η + v = P v + r ,
(39)
where r = r(δ) ∈ Rn and P = P (δ) is a stochastic matrix, with δ = δ0 or δk+1. It can be shown
that the solution η of such a system is unique, that one can eliminate for each final class F of P one
of the equations ηi = (Pη)i with index i ∈ F , and that v is defined up to an element of the kernel
of I − P , the dimension of which is equal to the number of final classes of P . When this number
is strictly greater than one, and v(k+1) is chosen to be any solution v′ of (37) in Algorithm 5, the
algorithm may cycles, see Section 6 for an example in the two player case. One way to handle
this [DF68, Put94], is either to fix to zero the value of µF v for each invariant measure µF of P
with support in a final class F of P , or to fix to zero the components of v with indices in some set
S containing exactly one node of each final class of P . In these two cases, the solution v of (39)
become unique. Moreover, if in Algorithm 5, (37) is combined with either the conditions µF v
′ = 0
or the conditions v′S = 0 with S chosen in a conservative way, that is such that the same index
is chosen in F for iterations k and k + 1, if F is a final class of P (δk+1) which is also a final class
of P (δk), then v′ = v(k) on the set of final nodes of P (δk+1) when η(k+1) = η(k), which implies
that v′ = v(k+1), hence Step 5 of Algorithm 5 becomes useless. This shows that Algorithm 4 is
equivalent to Algorithm 5, where (37) is combined with the conditions v′S = 0, where S is the set of
minimal indices of each final class of P (δk+1). In other words, Algorithm 4 is a particular realization
of Algorithm 5, where one chooses one special solution v′ = v(k+1) of (37) at each iteration of the
algorithm, even when η(k+1) 6= η(k). Denardo and Fox proved [DF68, Put94] that the sequence of
couples (η(k), v(k))k≥1 of Algorithm 4 is non decreasing in a lexicographical order, meaning that
η(k+1) ≥ η(k), with v(k+1) ≥ v(k) when η(k+1) = η(k), and that Algorithm 4 stops after a finite
number of iterations (when the sets of actions are finite). Indeed, the convergence of Algorithm 1,
proved in Section 4.3, shows that this also holds for the little more general Algorithm 5.
5.3 Critical graph
When a degenerate iteration (η(k+1) = η(k)) occurs in Step 4 of Algorithm 1, one has to compute
the critical nodes of g := f (σk+1), that is that of g¯. This can be done by applying the techniques
of [AG03, § 6.3] , leading to Algorithm 6 below. More precisely, one applies first the followings
steps to the map g¯ and its harmonic vector v′, then apply Algorithm 6.
Consider an additively homogeneous map g whose coordinates are defined as in (27) with (28),
and u a harmonic vector of g. For any set P of stochastic matrices, we define Gf(P) as the union
of the graphs of the matrices MFF , where M ∈ P and F is a final class of M . Define
B˜i = {b ∈ Bi | G(u; i, b) = u} and Pi = {P bi· | b ∈ B˜i} . (40)
Then, the critical graph of g is given by
Gc(g) = Gf(∂g(u)), where ∂g(u) = co(P1)× · · · × co(Pn) , (41)
and co(·) denotes the convex hull of a set. The following algorithm computes the graph in (41) for
a general family {Pi}i∈[n], where Pi ⊂ Rn is a nonempty finite set of stochastic vectors. Note that
any such family {Pi}i∈[n] corresponds to the map g : Rn → Rn such that
[g(v)]i = max
p∈Pi
pv for all i ∈ [n] , (42)
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which has u = 0 as a harmonic vector, and is of the above form. Hence the algorithm below
corresponds also to the computation of the critical graph of this map g.
Before writing the algorithm, we recall some definitions of graph theory (see for instance [CLRS01]).
We define a graph G := (V,E) as a finite set of vertices (or nodes) V and a set of edges (or
arcs) E := {(i, j) | i, j ∈ V }. A path of length l ≥ 0 is a sequence (i0, . . . , il) such that
ik ∈ V for k ∈ {0, . . . , l} and (ik, ik+1) ∈ E for k < l. A strongly connected component of G
is the restriction G|V ′ of G to some subset of nodes V ′ ⊆ V , that is the graph (V ′, E′) with
E′ := {(i, j) ∈ E | i, j ∈ V ′}, where V ′ is such that there exists a path from each node i ∈ V ′ to
every node j ∈ V ′. A strongly connected component G′ is called trivial if it consists in exactly
one node and no arcs. We define a final class of G = (V,E) as a non trivial strongly connected
component G′ = (V ′, E′) of G such that there exists no arc (i, j) ∈ E with i ∈ V ′ and j ∈ V \ V ′.
Note that the strongly connected components of a graph can be find using Tarjan algorithm,
see [CLRS01].
Algorithm 6 (Algorithm to compute the critical graph, compare with [AG03, § 6.3]).
Input : (P1, · · · ,Pn) where Pi ⊂ Rn is a finite set of stochastic vectors for i ∈ [n].
Output : A graph depending on P1, · · · ,Pn, equal to Gf(co(P1)× · · · × co(Pn)) if all the Pi are
nonempty; and its set of nodes.
1. Set F (0) = ∅, I(0) = [n], G(0) = ∅, Q(0)i = Pi for i ∈ [n], and k = 0.
2. If all the sets {Q(k)i }i∈I(k) are empty, then the algorithm stops and returns G(k) and F (k).
3. Otherwise, build the graph G = (I(k), E) with set of nodes I(k), and set of arcs E = {(i, j) ∈
I(k) × I(k) | pj 6= 0 for some p ∈ Q(k)i }. Set F as the union of final classes of G.
4. Put I(k+1) = I(k) \ F and F (k+1) = F (k) ∪ F .
5. Set G(k+1) = G(k) ∪G|F where G|F denotes the restriction of G to F .
6. For all i ∈ I(k+1), define the sets Q(k+1)i ⊂ RI
(k+1)
of row vectors obtained by restricting to
I(k+1) the vectors p ∈ Q(k)i such that
∑
j∈I(k+1) pj = 1.
7. Increment k by one, and go to Step 2.
The convergence (after at most n iterations) of this algorithm follows from variants of Lem-
mas 4.7 and 4.9 of [AG03], applied to the maps gk constructed by (42) from the families (Q(k)i )i∈[n].
Indeed, if all the Q(k)i with i ∈ I(k) are nonempty, the map gk is a map from Rn to itself and
Lemma 4.7 says that gk has at least one invariant critical class, which implies that the set F of
Step 3 is nonempty. Moreover, Lemma 4.9 says that, if all the Q(k+1)i with i ∈ I(k+1) are nonempty,
the critical graph of gk is equal to the union of G|F with the critical graph of the map gk+1.
In order to generalize these arguments, one need to extend the notion of critical graph to the
case of a map g from (R ∪ {−∞})n to itself, of the form (42) with general families {Pi}i∈[n] of
(possibly empty) finite sets of stochastic vectors (or of the form (27) with (28), with a harmonic
vector u ∈ (R ∪ {−∞})n). For instance, define the critical graph of g as the restriction to the set
of nodes i ∈ [n] such that Pi is nonempty (or ui 6= −∞) of the critical graph of g ∨ id, where id
is the identity map and ∨ denotes the supremum operation. Then, the identically −∞ map has
no critical class, any map g which is not identically −∞ has an invariant critical class, and the
above recurrence formula for critical graphs is true even if gk+1 takes −∞ values. This shows that
Algorithm 6 computes the critical graph of the map g associated to the family {Pi}i∈[n], even if
some of the sets of the family are empty.
Note that since Tarjan algorithm has a linear complexity in the number of arcs of a graph, the
complexity of the above algorithm is at most in the order of nm, where m is the sum of the number
of arcs of all the elements of Pi, i ∈ [n]. This is comparable with the complexity of solving the
linear systems of the form (33) by LU solvers, hence with the other steps of Algorithm 2.
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6 An example with degenerate iterations
In this section, we present an example of zero-sum two player stochastic game for which we en-
counter a degenerate iteration when using the policy iteration algorithm for the mean payoff prob-
lem, and showing that Step 5 of Algorithm 1 is essential to obtain the convergence of the algorithm.
Before doing this, let us note that some degenerate cases may be not so problematic. Indeed,
as observed before, the map g¯ of Step 5 of Algorithm 2 is a polyhedral order preserving additively
homogeneous convex map. By [AG03, Theorem 1.1], the set of fixed points of g¯ is isomorphic to a
convex set which dimension is the number of strongly connected components of the critical graph
of g¯ and which is invariant by the translations by a constant function. In particular, if the number
of strongly connected components of the critical graph is equal to one, then the set of fixed points
of g¯ is exactly equal to the translations of v′ by a constant, hence v(k+1)−v′ is a constant function.
Since all the maps considered in Algorithm 2 are additively homogeneous, this implies that taking
v′ instead of v(k+1), that is applying the same steps as in the nondegenerate case, does not change
the sequence of policies (σk), and the invariant half lines are just translated by a constant after
this degenerate iteration. Hence, the second part of Step 5 may be avoided in Algorithm 2, when
one encounters only such degenerate iterations. However, to know that g¯ has only one strongly
connected component in its critical graph, one need to apply the the first part of Step 5.
We show now an example for which degenerate iterations occur with two strongly connected
components of the critical graph of g¯. We shall call these iterations strongly degenerate.
We consider a directed graph, with a set of nodes (or edges) [n] and a set of arcs E ⊂ [n]× [n],
in which each arc (i, j) is equipped with a weight rij ∈ R, and consider the map f from Rn to
itself, defined by:
fi(v) =
1
2
(
max
j: (i,j)∈E
(rij + vj) + min
j: (i,j)∈E
(rij + vj)
)
. (43)
When the value of v is fixed at some “boundary” points, and the weights rij are independent of
j, the map f arises as the dynamic programming operator of the “tug of war” game [PSSW09],
which can viewed also as a discretization of the infinity Laplacian operator. Moreover the case
where all the weights rij are equal to zero corresponds to a class of auction games, called Richman
game [LLP+99]. Therefore, the above map f appears as the dynamic programming operator of a
variant of these games with additive reward and mean payoff.
We apply the policy iteration algorithm to such a game, with a graph of 5 nodes and complete
set of arcs E = [5]× [5]. Hence, the action spaces Ai and Bi in every state i ∈ [n] can be identified
with the set [5]. The weight of each arc (i, j) ∈ E is defined as the entry rij of the following matrix :
r =

1 −1 0 0 0
1 −1 0 0 0
0 0 1 −1 0
0 0 1 −1 0
0 −1 0 −1 1
 ,
the adjacency graph of which is represented in Figure 1.
Let us fix the initial strategy σ0 for the first player, such that σ0(1) = 2, σ0(2) = 2, σ0(3) = 4,
σ0(4) = 4, σ0(5) = 2. Then, the corresponding dynamic programming operator f
(σ0) is given by
f
(σ0)
1 (v) = f
(σ0)
2 (v) =
1
2
(−1 + v2 + max(1 + v1,−1 + v2, v3, v4, v5))
f
(σ0)
3 (v) = f
(σ0)
4 (v) =
1
2
(−1 + v4 + max(v1, v2, 1 + v3,−1 + v4, v5))
f
(σ0)
5 (v) =
1
2
(−1 + v2 + max(v1,−1 + v2, v3,−1 + v4, 1 + v5)) .
In Step 1 of Algorithm 1, we compute an invariant half-line of f (σ0) and obtain for instance
w(0)(t) = (η(0), v(0)), with v(0) = (0, 0,−0.5,−0.5, 0)T and η(0) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0)T . Since f(w(0)(t)) <
f (σ0)(w(0)(t)), we need to improve the policy (Step 3) and get the unique solution (even without
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Figure 1: Adjacency graph of r.
the conservative policy): σ1(1) = 2, σ1(2) = 2, σ1(3) = 4, σ1(4) = 4, σ1(5) = 4. The corresponding
operator is then given by :
f
(σ1)
i = f
(σ0)
i 1 ≤ i ≤ 4,
f
(σ1)
5 (v) =
1
2
(−1 + v4 + max(v1,−1 + v2, v3,−1 + v4, 1 + v5)) .
We compute then (in Step 4) an invariant half-line (η(1), v′) of f (σ1), and obtain η(1) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0)T
and for instance v′ = (0, 0, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5)T . Since η(1) = η(0), the iteration is degenerate.
Hence the algorithm enters in Step 5. Set g := f (σ1). We have to compute the critical graph
of g¯, which is here equal to g, for instance by applying Algorithm 6 to the sets Pi defined in (40)
with u = v′. They are given by P1 = P2 = {(0.5, 0.5, 0, 0, 0)}, P3 = P4 = {(0, 0, 0.5, 0.5, 0)},
P5 = {(0, 0, 0, 0.5, 0.5)}, then the critical graph of g is equal to the final graph of P1 × · · · × P5,
which is composed of two strongly connected components with nodes {1, 2} and {3, 4}. Then, v(1)
is the unique solution of:{
v
(1)
5 = f
(σ1)
5 (v) =
1
2 (−1.5 + max(0,−1,−0.5,−1.5, v(1)5 + 1))
v
(1)
i = v
(0)
i i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} .
We obtain v(1) = (0, 0,−0.5,−0.5,−0.5) and since f(w(1)(t)) = f (σ1)(w(1)(t)), the algorithm stops.
However, if we do not treat the degenerate case by using Step 5, and take for instance v(1) = v′,
we obtain f(w(1)(t)) < f (σ1)(w(1)(t)), hence we need to improve the strategy, and obtain the
unique solution σ2 = σ0. This means that the algorithm cycle, showing the necessity of Step 5 in
the policy iterations.
7 Implementation and numerical results
The numerical results presented in this section were obtained with a slight modification of the
policy iteration algorithm Algorithm 2) and of its ingredients of Section 5, all implemented in the
C library PIGAMES, see [Det12] for more information. All the tests of this section were performed
on a single processor: Intel(R) Xeon(R) W3540 - 2.93GHz with 8Go of RAM.
These slight modifications take into account the fact that (linear or nonlinear) equations may
not be solved exactly (in exact arithmetics) because of the errors generated by floating-point
computations, and also of the possible use of iterative methods instead of exact methods. Let us
explain them briefly. For instance, the stopping criterion in Step 2 of Algorithm 2 can be replaced
by a condition on the residual of the mean payoff, fˆ(η(k)) − η(k) and the residual of the relative
value, f´η(v
(k)) − η(k) − v(k). Here, we consider the infinity norm of the residual of the game that
we define as 0.5 ∗ (‖fˆ(η(k)) − η(k)‖∞ + ‖f´η(v(k)) − η(k) − v(k)‖∞), where ‖ · ‖∞ denotes the sup-
norm. Then, we stop the policy iterations when the infinity norm of the residual of the game is
smaller than a given value g > 0 or when the strategies cannot be improved. For the tests of
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this section, we took g = 10
−12. We use the same condition for the stopping criterion of the
intern policy iterations, that is for Step 3 of Algorithm 3 and Step 3 of Algorithm 4. Moreover,
the optimization problems in Step 3 of Algorithm 2 and Step 4 of Algorithms 3 and 4, are solved
up to some precision. This means for instance that in Algorithm 2, one choose σk+1 ∈ AM such
that, for all i ∈ [n],
F´η(k)(v
(k); i, σk+1(i)) ≤ v + min
a∈A´
i,η(k),η
{
F´η(k)(v
(k); i, a)
}
with
A´i,η, := {a ∈ Ai | Fˆ (η; i, a) ≤ + fˆ(η)]i}
σk+1(i) = σk(i) if σk(i) is optimal,
(44)
for some given η and v > 0. Finally, the linear systems in Step 2 of Algorithms 3 and 4 are
solved up to some precision, which may be lower bounded when the matrices of the systems are
ill-conditioned. See the appendix for details about the solution of these linear systems.
7.1 Variations on tug of war and Richman games
We now present some numerical experiments on the variant of Richman games defined in Section 6,
constructed on random graphs. As in the previous section, we consider directed graphs, with a set
of nodes equal to [n] and a set of arcs E ⊂ [n]2. The dynamic programming operator is the map f
defined in (43), where the value rij is the reward of the arc (i, j) ∈ E. In the tests of Figure 2 to
Figure 4, we chose random sparse graphs with a number of nodes n between 1000 and 50000, and
a number of outgoing arcs fixed to ten for each node. The reward of each arc in E has value one or
zero, that is rij = 1 or 0. The arcs (i, j) ∈ E and the associated rewards rij are chosen randomly
(uniformly and independently). We start the experiments with a sizer of graph (number of nodes)
equal to n = 1000, then we increase the size by 1000 until reaching n = 10000, after we increase
the size by 10000 and end with a number of 50000 nodes. For each size that we consider, we made
a sample of 500 tests. The results of the application of the policy iteration (Algorithm 2 with the
above modifications) on those games are presented in Figures 2 to 4 and are commented below.
Figure 2 gives for each size n, and among the sample of 500 tests, the number of tests that
encountered at least one strongly degenerate policy iteration for the first player. Hence, these
games require the degenerate case issue presented in this paper, that is Step 5 of Algorithm 1 or 2.
Moreover, from the data of Figure 2, we observe that approximately between 10 and 15 percent of
the tests have at least one strongly degenerate policy iteration for the first player.
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Figure 2: Tests on a variant of Richman games constructed on random graphs. The histogram
shows for each size (number of nodes), the number of tests having at least one strongly degenerate
policy iteration for the first player, among 500 tests.
In the table below we report the number of strongly degenerate iterations that occur in the
global sample of tests.
Number of strongly degenerate iterations 0 1 2 3 6
Number of tests 6051 919 28 1 1
We observe that in general there is no more than one or two strongly degenerate policy iterations
for our sample of tests. Note that in this section, a strongly degenerate policy iteration is to be
understood as a strongly degenerate iteration for the first player only, that is for Algorithm 2.
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In Figure 3, we draw on the left curves that represent the number of policy iterations for the
first player, that is the number of iterations of Algorithm 2, as a function of the size n of the
graph. The dashed lines on top and bottom are respectively the maximum and minimum value,
over the sample of 500 tests, and the plain line is the average value, all as a function of the size.
We observe that the average number of first player’s policy iterations is almost constant as the size
increases. Using the same model of representation, we show on the right of Figure 3 respectively
the maximum, average and minimum values for the total number of policy iterations for the second
player, that is the sum of the numbers of iterations of Algorithm 4 when applied by Algorithm 2,
as a function of the size. We also observe that these values do not vary a lot with the size.
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Figure 3: Tests on a variant of Richman games constructed on random graphs. On the left, the
curves from top to bottom represent respectively the maximum, average, minimum number of first
player’s policy iterations, among 500 tests, as a function of the number of nodes. On the right, the
curves represent the total number of second player’s policy iterations.
In Figure 4, we present on the left the total cpu time (in seconds) needed by the policy iteration
to find the solution of the game. As for the two previous figures, the curves from top to bottom
show respectively the maximum, average and minimum values, over the sample of 500 tests, as a
function of the size of the graphs. Finally, on the right of Figure 4, we give also the average of
the total cpu time (in seconds) needed to solve the game but we separated the tests with strongly
degenerate policy iteration(s), represented by the dashed line, from the non strongly degenerate
ones, represented by the plain curve. We observe that the average cpu time is somewhat greater
for the tests with strongly degenerate iteration(s). This is due to the additional steps needed for
degenerate iterations. Indeed, the cpu time of a degenerate iteration should be approximately the
double of that of a nondegenerate iteration, and since the number of policy iterations is around
10 in the sample of tests, the average of the total cpu time of tests with (strongly) degenerate
iterations should be approximately 10 percent greater than that of the other tests.
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Figure 4: Tests on a variant of Richman games constructed on random graphs. On the left, the
curves from top to bottom represent respectively the maximum, average and minimum values of
the total cpu time (in seconds) taken by the policy iteration algorithm, among 500 tests, as a
function of the number of nodes. On the right, the dashed line represents the average among the
tests that encounter at least one strongly degenerate policy iteration for the first player, whereas
the plain line represents the average among the other tests.
In addition, in Table 1, we give numerical results for ten tests of the variant of Richman game,
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constructed on random large graphs with a number of nodes between 105 and 106. We observe
that the number of iterations are of the same order as for the previous sample of tests presented
in Figure 3.
Table 1: Numerical results on a variant of Richman game constructed on random large graphs.
Number of Iterations of Total number Strongly degenerate Infinity norm CPU time
nodes first player of iterations iterations of residual (s)
100000 12 78 1 1.44e− 14 3.24e+ 02
200000 12 74 0 7.44e− 15 7.90e+ 02
300000 11 82 0 1.33e− 15 9.38e+ 02
400000 12 82 1 8.55e− 15 1.42e+ 03
500000 12 77 1 2.00e− 14 2.16e+ 03
600000 12 77 0 8.66e− 15 2.61e+ 03
700000 11 85 0 3.02e− 14 2.61e+ 03
800000 12 81 1 4.82e− 14 6.79e+ 03
900000 12 79 1 1.27e− 14 4.17e+ 03
1000000 12 90 1 3.33e− 15 1.96e+ 04
7.2 Pursuit games
We consider now a pursuit evasion game with two players : a pursuer and an evader. The evader
wants to maximize the distance between him and the pursuer and the pursuer has the opposite
objective. See for instance [BFS94, BFS99, LCS08] for a complete description of general pursuit
games. To simplify the model, we consider as state of the game, the distance between the two
players. Then, the state of the game is given by x = xP − xE where xP is the position of the
pursuer and xE the position of the evader. We also restrict the state x to stay in a unit square
centered in the 0-position, that is x ∈ X := [−0.5, 0.5] × [−0.5, 0.5]. At each time of the game,
the reward for the evader is the euclidean square norm of the distance between the two players,
i.e. ‖x‖22. Such a game is a special class of differential game, the dynamic programming equation
of which is an Isaacs partial differential equation. Under our simplifications and assumptions, the
Hamiltonian of this equation is given by :
H(x, p) = max
a∈A(x)
(a · p) + min
b∈B(x)
(b · p) + ‖x‖22 ∀x ∈ X, p ∈ R2 , (45)
meaning that in the case of a finite horizon problem, the Isaacs equation would be given, at least
formally (but also in the viscosity sense) by :
−∂v
∂t
+H(x,∇v(x)) = 0 x ∈ X .
Here A(x) and B(x) are the sets of possible directions for the evader and the pursuer respectively,
when the state is equal to x ∈ X. On the boundary, we consider that only actions keeping the
state of the game in the domain X are allowed, hence the above equation has to be satisfied until
the boundary.
We shall consider this differential game with a mean-payoff criterion and the above reward.
This means that the analogous to System (14) is the following system of Isaacs equations :
max
a∈A(x)
(a · ∇η(x)) + min
b∈B(x)
(b · ∇η(x)) = 0 , x ∈ X ,
−η(x) + max
a∈A´η(x)
(a · ∇v(x)) + min
b∈B´η(x)
(b · ∇v(x)) + ‖x‖22 = 0 , x ∈ X ,
(46)
where
A´η(x) :=argmax
a∈A(x)
(a · ∇η(x)) ,
B´η(x) :=argmin
b∈B(x)
(b · ∇η(x)) .
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In classical pursuit-evasion games, such as in [BFS99], the reward is constant and the value function
is defined as the time (or the exponential of the opposite of the time) for the pursuer to capture
the evader, then the value function is solution of the stationary Isaacs equation that is (46) with
η ≡ 0, corresponding to the above Hamiltonian with 1 instead of ‖x‖22. In that case, the value is
infinite when the pursuer’s speed is smaller than the evader’s speed, and it is would be difficult to
compute an optimal strategy using Isaacs equation. Here by considering a mean-payoff problem,
we may solve the problem even when pursuer’s speed is smaller than the evader’s speed, as we
shall see below. Note that one may have kept the reward equal to 1, but then the optimal value η
would have given less information.
A monotone discretization, for instance a finite difference discretization scheme (see [KD92]),
of System (46) yields to System (14) for the dynamic programming operator f of a discrete time
and finite state space game, which then may be solved using our policy iteration Algorithm 2.
In our tests, the domain X is discretized in each directions with a constant step size h. Then
the two players of the discrete game are moving on the discretized nodes of the domain, similarly to
the moves in a chess game. We assume also that the evader cannot move when the euclidean norm
of the relative distance between him and the pursuer is less than 0.1, i.e when x ∈ B((0, 0); 0.1).
We shall call the evader, the mouse and his set of possible actions at each state of the game will
given by :
A(x) :=
{
{(a1, a2) | al ∈ {0, 1,−1}, l = 1, 2} x ∈
◦
X \ B((0, 0); 0.1)
{(0, 0)} x ∈ B((0, 0); 0.1) ,
where
◦
X denotes the interior of X. The pursuer, that we shall call the cat, has the following set
of possible actions :
B(x) := {(b1, b2) | bl ∈ {0, b¯,−b¯}, l = 1, 2} x ∈
◦
X ,
where b¯ is a positive real constant and represents the speed of the cat. Moreover, on the boundary
of X, the sets A(x) and B(x) are restricted to avoid actions that bring the state out of X.
Numerical results for this game are presented in Table 2 when b¯ = 0.999 , b¯ = 1 and b¯ = 1.001
respectively. Note that the solution of the discretization of Equation (46) may differ from the
solution of the continuous equation. We observe that for b¯ = 0.999 and b¯ = 1.001, we have a
strongly degenerate iteration for the first player on the last iteration.
The optimal actions for the discretized problem with b¯ = 0.999 are represented in Figure 5, at
each node of the grid: the actions of the mouse are on the left, and that of the cat are on the right.
The optimal actions are approximately the same for the two other values of b¯. When b¯ = 0.999,
the speed of the cat is smaller than the speed of the mouse (= 1). The numerical results for the
discretized game give an optimal mean-payoff η such that η(x) = 0.492 for x ∈ X \ B((0, 0); 0.1)
and η(x) = 0 for x ∈ B((0, 0); 0.1). This means that the cat cannot catch the mouse when their
starting positions are not too close and the mouse can keep almost the maximum distance between
them. The relative value is represented on the left of Figure 6. When b¯ = 1, the speeds of the
cat and the mouse are equal. The numerical results for the discretized game give a relative value
v approximately equal to zero for every starting point and an optimal mean-payoff η(x) ≈ ‖x‖22,
meaning that the cat and mouse keep the same initial distance all along the game. In the last
example, the speed of the cat b¯ = 1.001 is greater than that of the mouse (= 1). The numerical
results for the discretized game give an optimal mean-payoff η close to zero. The relative value v
is given on the right of Figure 6. In this case, the cat catches the mouse.
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A Details of implementation of Policy Iteration for multi-
chain one player games
We explain in more details here why System (33) has a unique solution and is selecting one special
solution of System (37) with k instead of k + 1, and how it is solved practically (see also [DF68,
Put94]).
Recall that System (37) is of the form (39) rewritten here:{
η = P η
η + v = P v + r ,
where r = r(δ) ∈ Rn and P = P (δ) is a stochastic matrix, with δ = δk+1. Moreover, System (33)
corresponds to  ηi = (Pη)i i ∈ [n] \ S ,ηi + vi = (Pv)i + ri i ∈ [n] ,
vi = 0 i ∈ S ,
(47)
where r and P are as before but with δ = δk, and where S is composed of minimal indices iF of
each final classes F of P . Then one need to show that System 47 has a unique solution and is
selecting one special solution of System (39).
First, for all final classes F of P , PFF is an irreducible Markov matrix, hence the equation
ηF = (Pη)F , which is equivalent to ηF = PFF ηF , is also equivalent to the condition that ηi = ηj
for all i, j ∈ F . Moreover, PFF has a unique stationary (or invariant) probability measure piF ,
that is a row probability vector solution of piF = piFPFF , and this vector has strictly positive
coordinates. This implies that one can eliminate, for each final class F of P , one equation with
index i in F in the equation η = Pη, without changing the set of solutions. Hence, any solution of
System 47 is also solution of (39).
Second, denote by F the union of final classes, and by T the union of transient classes, that
is the complement in [n] of F . Then, w is in the kernel of I − P if, and only if, it satisfies
wF = PFFwF , for all final classes F of P and wT = PT T wT + PT FwF . As said before the first
equations are equivalent to the conditions wi = wj for all i, j ∈ F . Since PT T has transient classes
only, it has a spectral radius strictly less than one, which implies that given the vectors wF for
all final classes F , the equation wT = PT T wT + PT FwF has a unique solution wT . Hence, the
dimension of the kernel of I − P is equal to the number of final classes of P , and any element of
this kernel which has one coordinate i ∈ F equal to zero for each final classes F of P , has all its
coordinates equal to zero. This implies that given η ∈ Rn, the solution v of System (47) is unique
if it exists (the difference between two such solutions satisfies the above conditions). This also
implies that the codimension of the image of I − P is equal to the number of final classes. Hence,
the image of I − P is exactly equal to the set of vectors η ∈ Rn such that piF ηF = 0, for all final
classes F of P . A vector η ∈ Rn is such that System (47) has a solution v ∈ Rn if and only if
η = Pη and η− r is in the image of I −P . These conditions are equivalent to the three conditions
ηi = ηj for all i, j ∈ F , for all final classes F , ηT = PT T ηT + PT FηF , and piF ηF = piF rF , for all
final classes F . The first and third conditions together are equivalent to ηi = piF rF , for all i ∈ F ,
and all final classes F of P , which gives a unique solution ηF . Since the second one has a unique
solution ηT , given ηF , we get that there is a unique vector η ∈ Rn such that System (47) has a
solution v ∈ Rn. In conclusion, System (47) has a unique solution (η, v), which finishes the proof
what we wanted to show.
One may try to solve System (47) by using usual LU methods, however when P is not irreducible,
such a method is not robust. We rather use the decomposition of P in classes, and the previous
properties. In particular, since PT T has a spectral radius strictly less than 1, one can compute
(η, v) solution of System (47) by first computing ηF and vF , for all final classes F of P , then
computing successively ηT and vT which are respectively fixed points of contracting affine systems
with tangent linear operator PT T :{
ηT = PT T ηT + PT F ηF
vT = PT T vT + PT FvF + rT − ηT .
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There exists two ways to compute ηF and vF . One is to compute the stationary probability piF
to determine ηF by ηi = piF rF , for all i ∈ F , and then solve the following system with unknown
vF ∈ RF :
vF = PFF vF + rF − ηF ,
by eliminating one equation (since one equation is redundant) with index j ∈ F , and adding the
condition vi = 0 for one element i ∈ F . Another method is to consider ηF as constant, say ηi = η¯
for i ∈ F , and solve the system with unknowns η¯ ∈ R and v ∈ RF :
η¯ + vi =
∑
j∈F
Pij vj + ri, i ∈ F ,
by adding the condition vi = 0 for one element i ∈ F . In our algorithm, we choose the index
i = j ∈ F to be the minimal index of F (for a fixed total ordering of nodes). This method gives
the following algorithm to solve System (47).
Algorithm 7 (Solution of System (47)). Decompose the matrix P into irreducible classes and
permute nodes without changing the order in each class, such that P takes the following form :
P =

P11 P12 . . . . . . P1m
0 P22 . . . . . . P2m
...
...
...
...
...
0 . . . . . . Pm−1,m−1 Pm−1,m
0 . . . . . . 0 Pmm

where m denotes the number of irreducible classes and PII are square irreducible submatrices of
P , for I = 1, . . . ,m. Note that, the class corresponding to a submatrix PII is final if and only if
the submatrices PIJ are all null for all J 6= I.
For each class I from m to 1, do the following :
Step 1. If I corresponds to a final class, that is PII is a stochastic matrix, do one of the two
following sequences of operations :
A. (a) Find the stationary probability piI of PII : piI PII = piI ,
(b) Set η¯ = piI rI and ηi = η¯ i ∈ I ,
(c) Solve the system with unknown vI ∈ RI :{
vi =
∑
j∈I Pijvj + ri − η¯ i ∈ I \ S ,
vi = 0 i ∈ S ∩ I , (48)
B. Solve the system with unknowns vI ∈ RI and η¯ ∈ R :{
η¯ + vi =
∑
j∈I Pijvj + ri i ∈ I ,
vi = 0 i ∈ S ∩ I ,
and set ηi = η¯ i ∈ I ,
Step 2. if I corresponds to a transient class, that is if PII is a strictly submarkovian matrix. do
the following steps :
(a) compute ηI solution of the following system :
ηI = PIIηI +
∑
J>I
PIJηJ
(b) compute vI solution of the following system :
vI = PIIvI +
∑
J>I
PIJvJ + rI − ηI .
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In our numerical experiments, the linear system (33) at each intern policy iteration is solved
by using Algorithm 7. For the numerical experiments of Section 7.1, on each final class, we used a
SOR iterative solver to find the stationary probability piI and also to compute the corresponding
vI in method A in Step 1 of Algorithm 7. For the transient class, we used the LU solver of the
package [DEG+99].
The Successive Over-Relaxation (SOR) method is an iterative scheme that belongs to the class
of splitting methods or relation methods, see for instance [BP94]. It is derived from the Gauss-
Seidel relaxation scheme. Consider a matrix A ∈ Rn×n such that A = D−L−U where D, −L, −U
are respectively the diagonal, lower and upper triangular part of A. The SOR smoothing operator
is defined by Sw = M
−1N where M = D − wL and N = [(1− w)D + wU ] for 0 < w < 2.
Consider the irreducible stochastic matrix PII ∈ RI×I and decompose I − PTII = D − L − U
where I is the identity matrix of RI×I . Starting from an initial positive approximation pi(0) ∈ RI ,
a SOR smoothing step to find the stationary probability of PII is given by :
pi(k) = Sw pi
(k−1)
pi(k+1) =
pi(k)(∑
i∈[n] pi
(k)
i
) ·
The sequence (pi(2k))k≥0 converges to the transpose of the stationary probability of PII when
the limit limk→∞ S
(k)
w exists, see [BP94] for more details. To solve Equation (48), decompose
I − PII = D − L− U . Then, starting from an initial approximation v(0) ∈ RI , a SOR smoothing
step consists in :
v(k) = (I − 1µ) (Sw v(k−1) + M−1(rI − ηI))
where 1 = (1 . . . 1)T ∈ RI , and µ ∈ RI is a row vector such that µi = 1 for i ∈ S ∩ I, and
µi = 0 otherwise. The sequence (v
(k))k≥0 converges to the solution of Equation (48) when the
limk→∞ S
(k)
w exists, see [BP94] for more details.
For the numerical tests of Section 7.2, we used the LU solver of the package [DEG+99] in both
cases.
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